Olena Chumachenko

E-TEXTBOOK FOR STUDENTS

AN INTRODUCTION TO

European political integration

e-Textbook for students | *Jean Monnet Module*

Oleksadnr Dovzhenko Hlukhiv
National Pedagogical University

Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine

Oleksandr Dovzhenko Hlukhiv National Pedagogical University

OLENA CHUMACHENKO

AN INTRODUCTION TO
EUROPEAN POLITICAL INTEGRATION

students' textbook

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REVIEWERS:

Tkachenko N.M., Doctor of Pedagogical Science, Associate Professor, Vice-Rector of Scientific Work and International Activity, Oleksandr Dovzhenko Hlukhiv National Pedagogical University

Honiukova L.V., Doctor of Science in Public Administration, Professor, Professor of Public Administration Department, Educational and Research Institute of Public Administration and Civil Service, Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv

The students' textbook "An introduction to European political integration" is for students who study the training course "European Political Integration: Historical Retrospective and Nowadays" and is the implementation result of the Erasmus + Jean Monnet Modules European Political Integration: Historical Retrospective and Nowadays" 621046-EPP-1-2020-1-UA-EPPJMO-MODULE.

Particular attention is paid to the formation and development of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy, the formation of the EU's crisis management function in the security and defense sector. The course actualizes the EU's transition from the three-pillar structure to the completion of the EU as a legal entity and global actor in international relations and the European security space.

PREFACE

The students' textbook "An introduction to European political integration" is the result of the experience gained in teaching the training course "European Political Integration: Historical Retrospective and Nowadays" for students of the specialty 014 Secondary education (History) within the implementation of the Erasmus + Jean Monnet Modules *European Political Integration: Historical Retrospective and Nowadays" 621046-EPP-1-2020-1-UA-EPPJMO-MODULE* at Oleksandr Dovzhenko Hlukhiv National Pedagogical University from 2020.

The study of European political integration has become increasingly relevant in connection with Ukraine's application for EU membership in 2022.

Currently, Ukraine is implementing the Association Agreement with the EU, including the principle of cooperation with the EU in the field of Common Foreign and Security Policy. Given the military aggression of the russian federation against Ukraine in 2014 and Russia's full-scale war against Ukraine since February 24, 2022, the relevance of studying the political aspects of European integration, including security and defense issues in the training course "European Political Integration: Historical Retrospective and Nowadays" is undeniable.

The textbook is aimed at liquidating lack of information about European political integration and fundamentals of the European Union as a global actor.

Particular attention is paid to the formation and development of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy, the formation of the EU's crisis management function in the security and defense sector. The course actualizes the EU's transition from the three-pillar structure to the completion of the EU as a legal entity and global actor in international relations and the European security space.

1. The emergence and development of ideas and concepts of a united Europe

1.1 Historical origins of ideas and concepts of a united Europe.
1.2 Pan-European movement: causes, main ideas and development.
1.3 European integration: definition, factors, theories.

1.1 Historical origins of ideas and concepts of a united Europe

Self-reflection questions:

- *What is your current knowledge about the historical origins of the idea of a united Europe?*
- *How familiar are you with the historical events and figures associated with this concept?*
- *Can you identify some of the earliest instances or thinkers who proposed the idea of European unity?*

Various projects of European unity that emerged in the course of the continent's historical development were based on a number of motives and needs:

Dante Alighieri (1265–1321)

overcoming enmity and strife between European nations, external factors (reconquest of the Holy Lands, struggle against the Turks), ensuring or avoiding the hegemony of one state, economic advantages, and preserving Europe's leading role in the world. In the Middle Ages, supporters of a united Europe focused on the possibility of restoring the Roman Empire within Christian Europe. The project of creating a Christian empire was supported by **Dante (1308)**. This idea was embodied in the efforts of Charlemagne, Otto I, and Charles V.

The formation of nation-states, however, made its realization impossible, as it required the long-term domination of one European state over all others. With the establishment of sovereign states in Europe, numerous projects of their confederative or federal unification arose. In an effort to prevent interstate conflicts in Europe, prominent European thinkers and politicians were inclined to believe that state sovereignty should be limited.

Considering the state and its interests as the root cause of interstate contradictions that lead to military conflicts, supporters of the "United Europe" advocated the need to create a supranational association that would be guided

primarily by common interests rather than the interests of individual states. This goal has remained unchanged for centuries. Only the tasks, forms and methods of achieving such an association have changed.

George of Poděbrady

Among the first known political projects to unite European states was the plan for the Return of the Holy Land, developed in the early fourteenth century by **Pierre de Bois**, an adviser to **King Philip XIII of France**. The project promoted the idea of restoring the lost unity of European peoples on a religious basis and envisaged the creation of a council of Christian monarchs under the auspices of the Pope and an arbitration tribunal, which were to maintain peaceful coexistence between Christian states and organize a joint struggle against Muslims.

In **146**4, **King George of Poděbrady** (Jiří of Poděbrady (*Czech: Jiří z Poděbrad)* put forward a project to unite Christian states, which was not so much about creating a European union as about eliminating interstate conflicts in Europe. To this end, it was proposed to convene a Sejm of representatives of sixteen kingdoms, which would play the role of an arbitration court in resolving conflicts and ensure a joint struggle against the Ottoman Empire.

Maximilien de Béthune (1559-1641), 1er duc de Sully

Later, in **1617**, the **Duke de Sully**, an adviser to King Henry IV of France, came up with the idea of the "Grand Plan," which envisaged the formation of a federation of fifteen Christian states, headed by a senate of 66 representatives. The main goal of the union was to create a European army to maintain stability and combat external threats.

Similar ideas were also developed by **Eric Lacroix**, who proposed in **1623** to make Venice the capital of Europe. In **1693**, **William Penn**, an English Quaker, supported the idea of establishing a European council, parliament, or even a state in his work Essay on the Present and Future Peace of Europe.

Charles-Irénée Castel de Saint-Pierre (1658-1743)

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804)

One of the famous representatives of the French Enlightenment of the eighteenth century, **Abbé de Saint-Pierre**, was fascinated by similar projects and published his **"Project for Perpetual Peace in Europe"** in **1713**. In **1795**, the famous German philosopher **Immanuel Kant** wrote a similar philosophical **"The Perpetual Peace Project".** Both projects envisaged the establishment of a senate or a permanent congress, whose decisions would be binding on the participating states. Thus, despite the diversity of European projects, they were quite similar in their components: unification of states, subordination to the decisions of the European Senate or Sejm, arbitration of conflicts, creation of an army to apply sanctions and conduct foreign military operations, primarily against the Ottoman Empire.

These projects were mostly abstract and theoretical in nature. In the nineteenth century, supporters of national self-determination (**Giuseppe Mazzini, Victor Hugo**) believed that, having freed themselves from monarchical power, European nations would be able to unite within a single Europe.

The Austrian diplomat **Friedrich von Genz** and the Swiss lawyer **Johann Caspar Bluntschli** substantiated the theory of "**a concert" of European states.** At the same time, relying on the federal experience of Switzerland (the Pact of Perpetual Union of 1291), the Netherlands (the Union of Utrecht in 1579) and Germany (from the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation to the formation of the Second Reich in 1871), J. Altusius, Charles-Louis Montesquieu, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Pierre-Joseph Proudhon provided the theoretical basis for European federalism.

In **1814**, **Claude Henri de Saint-Simon** published his thoughts on the reorganization of the European community to unite the peoples of Europe into one political entity, while preserving the national independence of each of them.

In **1849**, the French Writer **Victor Hugo**, addressing **the Congress of Friends of Peace in Paris**, called for the creation of the United States of Europe. "The day will

come, - he said, - when you, France, you, Russia, you, Italy, you, England, you, Germany, you, all the nations of the continent, without losing your distinctive features and your outstanding individuality, will merge into a closer community and create a European brotherhood".

Victor-Marie Hugo (1802-1885)

Similar slogans were also voiced at the Congress of Friends of Peace in Geneva, chaired by **Giuseppe Garibaldi**. Thus, the ideologues of the **"united Europe"** were guided by the romantic idea of restoring the lost unity through the gradual growth of understanding of their European identity among the peoples, which, in turn, would create opportunities for establishing "eternal peace" on the continent. This did not take into account political, economic, and social realities.

Thus, since the decline of the Roman Empire, Europe has been shaped as a historical, cultural, political, and social community that, despite wars, religious strife, and the formation of nation-states, has become a place of intense intellectual, cultural, and ideological exchange, as well as the movement of goods and capital. For centuries, the European idea remained a dream of harmony and unity, an unattainable ideal to which the best European thinkers aspired, while political realities were reduced to the struggle of European countries for dominance or balance of power, and the worldview of the vast majority of the continent's population remained limited to regional and, eventually, national horizons.

1.2 The Pan-European Movement: reasons, main ideas and development

Self-reflection questions:

- *What is the Pan-European Movement, and what were its primary motivations or reasons for its establishment?*
- *Who were the key figures or leaders behind the Pan-European Movement, and how did they contribute to its development?*
- *What were the main ideas or principles that underpinned the Pan-European Movement's vision for Europe?*

The idea of European unity gained particularly wide support from the public and many representatives of the intellectual, political, and economic elite in the years of the twentieth century. The most active role in promoting the idea of "European unification" was played by the Pan-European Union, an organization founded in 1923 by Austrian Count **Richard-Nicholas Coudenhove-Kalergi**, who in 1926 convened a congress in Vienna with the participation of more than 2,000 delegates from 24 countries, chaired by Foreign Minister Aristide Briand. As early as 1922 Coudenhove-Kalergi published his work "Pan-Europe, the Project", in which he:

Richard Nikolaus Eijiro, Count of Coudenhove-Kalergi (1894-1972)

 - analyzes the ideas of a major industrialist Louis Luscher (introduced the use of reinforced concrete in France, Minister of Military Supply during World War I, then Minister of Reparations, reorganizer of French industry, Minister of Labor);

 - states that modern wars require participants to have a gigantic industrial potential, therefore, there is an opportunity to avoid conflict between major powers by placing their resources under collective control, therefore, there is hope of preventing a new war between France and Germany in the event of joint control of German coal and French steel by these countries;

- develops the ideas of **Louis Loucheur** and **Giovanni Agnelli** (in 1918 he published "The European Federation and the League of Nations," in which he proposed the creation of a European continental federation with centralized power) in the field of European federalism as an antidote to revanchist nationalism, proposes to create a United States of Europe on the American model.

Louis Loucheur (1872-1937)   Giovanni Agnelli (1866 - 1945)

In 1923 Count Coudenhove-Kalergi founded the Pan-Europe publishing house in Vienna, where he published his first political work under the same title, which became one of the most important intellectual phenomena of European public thought of the interwar era. Coudenhove-Kalergi believed that the transition from European anarchy to European unification had to take place in stages.

The first step towards a united Europe was to convene a European conference to decide on periodic meetings and the creation of a European bureau, which would become the driving force of European unification.

As a second step toward Pan-Europe, Coudenhove-Kalergi considered the conclusion of a treaty binding on all democratic states of continental Europe. The third step was to be the creation of a single European customs union and the unification of Europe into a single economic area. The highest step on the road to a united Europe would be a constitution of the United States of Europe modeled after the United States of America.

The parliament of a united Europe would consist of two chambers: a chamber of peoples and a chamber of states. In relation to the rest of the world, a united Europe was to act as an integral entity, while within the federation each state would have maximum freedom. In addition,

Coudenhove-Kalergi developed the idea of creating a federal court, as well as a project to "codify European international law."

In October 1923, Coudenhove-Kalergi founded **the Pan-European Union in Vienna**, the first federalist movement in Europe. **Ignaz Seipel**, the Federal Chancellor of Austria, became the chairman of the Union. The founder of the Pan-European movement succeeded, particularly in Austria and Germany, in bringing the movement beyond the boundaries of individual parties. The central idea of Pan-Europeanism was the project of creating a federal union of European states.

Ignaz Seipel (1876-1932)

During the 1920s, the Pan-European idea became widespread: national committees of the Pan-European Union were formed in Belgium, Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Luxembourg, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Germany, and France. In France, the national Pan-European committee included the government leadership and numerous parliamentarians, including the future head of the Popular Front governments in 1936-1938 and one of the founders of the Council of Europe, Leon Blum.

The statesman who devoted himself to the struggle to make a Pan-European political vision the goal of French foreign policy was Aristide Briand. It was thanks to his persistent efforts that the project of European unification began to be seriously studied in European government offices.

The first European Congress, organized by the Pan-European Union, was held in **Vienna** on **October 4-6, 1926**. It was attended by two thousand delegates from 24 countries. The Congress was held in an atmosphere of deep concern for the future of Europe, due to the active spread of fascist and communist ideologies on the continent, and political conflicts between the leading European states. In this regard, the main task of the congress, as well as of the Pan-European movement as a whole, was to spread the idea of a united Europe among parliamentarians, government officials, business and public figures.

As a result of intensive discussions, the first Congress adopted the program goals and objectives of the Pan-European Union. In particular, it was about the need to create a European confederation based on guarantees of equality, security, and

sovereignty of each European state, a federal European court to settle conflicts between European states, European military, customs, and monetary unions, as well as the development of a European cultural community and the protection of national and religious minorities. Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi was elected chairman of the Union.

In 1927, he was replaced by French Foreign Minister **Aristide Briand**, honorary chairman of the international Pan-European Union. The first official governmental proposals for European construction also occurred at this time. French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand, who was an active participant in the Pan-European movement, made a speech at the League of Nations Assembly in Geneva in 1929 calling for the creation of a European federation.

Aristide Pierre Henri Briand
(1862 - 1932)

This proposal was concretized in the **Memorandum on the Organization of the Regime of a Federal European Union**, published by the French government in May 1930. The Memorandum for the first time used such widespread and relevant concepts and goals as "common market", "customs union", "movement of goods, capital and citizens", "protection of economically backward European regions", "community of European peoples", etc.

The establishment of dictatorial regimes in Europe and the outbreak of World War II played a catalytic role in the growth of the credibility of the idea of European unification. The driving force behind this process was the Resistance Movement, which supported the idea of European unity.

As early as 1939, the leader of the French Socialists, Leon Blum, called for the defense of "the independence of nations within a federal and disarmed Europe." In 1941 in Italy, Altiero Spinelli and Ernesto Rossi founded the European Federalist Movement. In 1943, at a meeting in Milan, its program and strategy of action were adopted, which saw the formation of a European federation as the only way to preserve democratic freedoms in Europe and prevent the establishment of international anarchy.

The federalist ideas developed in the Manifesto played a mobilizing role in the formation of the European Resistance Movement against Nazi Germany. Under the domination of Nazism in Europe, more and more supporters of the idea of limiting national state sovereignty in favor of a European federation as a guarantor of peace and security appeared among the population of European countries. The main slogan of the federalist movement, the main driving force behind its development, was the idea of democracy and freedom. The resistance movement during the Second World War considered European unity to be the central point of its program of reorganization of postwar politics, economy, and society, and this was reflected in the literature of the resistance.

During the war R. Coudenhove-Kalergi lived in the United States (he taught at New York University), where he conducted active lobbying activities to persuade Washington to impose a federal organization on Europe immediately after the peace was established.

In 1946 his idea is approved by the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), which includes it in the list of recommendations of the US State Department.

On May 8, 1946 The British Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, presents a joint project of the United States and Great Britain for the United States of Europe to create a common Anglo-American citizenship, the so-called English-speaking empire, and a large free trade zone.

Allen Welsh Dulles (1893 - 1969)

In September 1946, **Allen Dallas**, the new chairman of the CFR, created the Union of European Federalists (UEF) in Switzerland under the leadership of Alexandre Marc to mobilize public opinion to accelerate integration (i.e., the loss of state sovereignty).

Meanwhile, on March 17, 1948, France, the United Kingdom, and the Benelux countries signed a military alliance in Brussels. Former British Prime Minister **Winston Churchill** promoted the so-called "unionist ideas" in contrast to the federalist position of Spinelli and his Union of European Federalists.

On September 19, 1946, Winston Churchill delivered a speech at the University of Zurich, where he called on the former enemies - Germany, France, and Great Britain - to reconcile and create a "United States of Europe."

The differences between them became apparent during the **Congress of Europe in The Hague (May 7-10, 1948),** which was convened on Churchill's initiative to unite the League for European Cooperation, the Union of Federalists, and other similar organizations. As a result, the leaders of the European movement (the so-called The British) decide to close Senator Fulbright's Committee and suspend Coudenhove-Kalergi from participation.

Sir Winston Leonard Spencer Churchill (1874-1965)

On January 5, 1949 a new structure was created to oversee the construction of a united Europe: The American Committee for a United Europe (ACUE) in New York. This Committee was a non-governmental showcase of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), whose goal was to secretly fund all European federalist organizations. It was through the mediation of this committee that meetings on the future European organization were held in Westminster in early 1949, funded by the ACUE, which resulted in the creation of the Council of Europe, headed by Belgian Prime Minister Paul Henri Spaak. The Statute of **the Council of Europe**, signed on **5 May 1949**, brought into existence the Council of Europe, an international organisation open to all European states devoted to "the pursuit of peace based on justice and international co-operation". The Council of Europe was a compromise that resulted from the Pan-European movement after World War II and coincides with the creation of North-Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Session of the Congress of Europe held in The Hague, 1948, source: European Movement, http://www.europeanmovement.eu/index.php?id=7035.

1.3 European integration: definitions, factors, theories, stages

Self-reflection questions:

- *How would you define European integration, and what are its primary goals and objectives?*
- *Can you distinguish between economic integration and political integration within the context of European integration?*
- *What historical events and treaties have contributed to the development and definition of European integration?*

There are a lot of definitions of integration. Let's consider some of them:

Integration (*M. Narinsky*) is the process of uniting states in the economic, political, military and other spheres with elements of ***supranationality***.

> *SUPRANATIONALISM is the legal quality of an international organization in which sovereign member states transfer part of their sovereignty to supranational bodies for making decisions that are binding on member states*

Integration (*Leon Lindbergh*) is "the process by which nations refrain from the desire and ability to pursue foreign and, in key respects, domestic policies independent of each other, seeking instead to make joint decisions or delegating decision-making to new central bodies."

Integration (*Carl Deutsch*) is a process and condition that tends to replace fragmented international units with new more or less broad associations that are empowered to make independent decisions in one or more specific areas or in all areas that are within the competence of the underlying structures.

Factors that contributed to the European integration process:

- compensation for the collapse of the Eastern European market, which led to the need to intensify mutual cooperation;

- the desire of Western European countries to strengthen their positions in the world market in the face of a powerful competitor - the United States;

- attempts to compensate for the disappearance of the colonial system and the loss of colonial trade and other ties by strengthening interconnection;

- Western European countries' heavy dependence on foreign markets and international production conditions;

- similarity of economic structures, a long period of mutual economic cooperation;

- territorial proximity.

Among the wide variety of theoretical and conceptual approaches to European integration, there are several directions.

Federalism (representative **Amitai Etzioni**, who formed the concept during World War II, in the United States):

- the idea of merging states into a single federation under the authority of a single government;

- the decisive role in this process belongs to political institutions;

- the political community that emerges as a result of such processes, must meet three criteria:

(Amitai Etzioni 1929-2023)

1) ensure effective control of the center over the use of means of violence;

2) have the ability to effectively distribute resources and rewards within the community;

3) the government should be the center of political identification for a significant majority of citizens.

- political integration is a condition for moving toward economic unification.

There are **two forms of federalist association**: federation and confederation.

The federation is based on the method of institutional integration - the merger of the main institutions of states into new international legal structures. At the same time, the sovereignty of the subjects of the federation is limited (not a gradual transition from simple to more complex forms, but a one-time international legal act).

The confederation reflects a much lower level of localization of international legal personality. Its powers in the field of foreign and domestic policy are much more limited. Member states transfer a small part of their sovereignty to the confederation institutions on a small range of issues. The guarantor of the integrity of the state is the right of veto, which makes it possible to block any decision of the central authorities that does not meet the national interests of the confederation.

Functionalism (founder **David Mitrany**, Working Peace System, Chicago, 1966):

- states should start cooperation by uniting in non-political (economic, social, technical, environmental) spheres that lead to "sharing of sovereignty" and, in the long run, to political integration of states;

- the least difficult problems should be solved first, from which all participants will obviously benefit, and only then gradually move on to more difficult political problems that affect the most precious thing that states have - sovereignty.

This theory influenced some of the leaders who stood at the origins of European integration, including Jean Monnet. At the same time, it has been criticized for underestimating the leading role of politics, which is associated with socio-economic processes that require political decisions.

Neofunctionalism emerged in the late 1950s and 1960s (**Leon Lindberg**):

- economic and political phenomena are interconnected;

- cooperation and coordination in functional (sectoral) policies, as well as the development of a policy network that crosses state borders and is linked to supranational coordinating bodies, play a significant role.

Classical neo-functionalism was formulated by **Ernest Haas in 1958**. The key idea of the theory is the so-called **SPILLOVER** - overflow, going beyond:

1) the type of "spillover" is functional, arising from interdependent economies, which makes it impossible to limit integration to individual sectors of the economy;

2) political "spillover" follows economic integration, leading to the formation of supranational political elites that begin to exert pressure from above in favor of deepening integration processes.

Both federalism and functionalism sought to establish a peaceful system of international relations, which was vital for postwar Europe. Neo-functionalism, which is essentially a revisionist version of functionalism, was distinguished by its fundamental novelty.

Developed by a group of American researchers led by **Ernest Haas**, by the 1960s neofunctionalism had become the leading theory of European integration. The ideas of neofunctionalism were obviously intertwined with the plans of the first architects of the European Community. For example, it is easy to find a direct link between Monnet's "method of integration" (first, the unification of economic structures, then political ones) and the main provisions of neofunctionalism, as outlined by E. Haas in his work "The Unification of Europe: Political, Economic and Social Forces 1950-1957".

A strong point of neofunctionalism was the desire for managed integration at the regional level. And the most significant difference from classical functionalism was that politics was put to the fore, the desire for political cooperation, but through economic cooperation. Thus, having freed itself from a number of shortcomings of the functionalists, the updated theory brought clarity to the integration process.

Forms of European integration:

- free trade area;

- customs union;

- creation of an internal market;

- creation of an economic and monetary union;

- the final stage is a political union and the formation of military structures.

Stages of European integration (periodization):

1. 1951 - 1956

- 1951 – Treaty of Paris about the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) creation; sectoral integration;

- an attempt to create a European defense community and a military-political union (the plan of Pleven, the French Prime Minister, failed by France);

2. Late 1950s - early 1970s - the golden era in the life of the European community:

- 1957 - Treaties of Rome about Euratom and European Economic Community creation;

- early creation of the Customs Union;

- formation of a Single agricultural market;

- accession of new members (Great Britain, Denmark, Ireland) to the European Economic Community (common market) (1st enlargement).

3. Mid-1970s - mid-1980s

- stagnant years (years of Euro sclerosis):

- acute crisis in the development of the EEC;

- subsequent stabilization, which began with attempts to conclude an economic and monetary union and the establishment of a mechanism of military-political consultations.

4. Mid-1980s-1992

- 1981 – Greece joining the EEC (2nd enlargement);

- 1986 – Spain and Portugal joining the EEC (3rd enlargement);

- the period of resumption of the progressive development of integration processes:

- adoption of the Single European Act (1986);

- creation of the European Union;

- completion of the internal market;

- conclusion of the Economic and Monetary Union;

- gradual enlargement of the EU.

5. 1993 – 2007

- 1 November 1993 – Treaty of European Union entered into force;

- The 4th enlargement of EU (Austria, Sweden, Finland);

- The 5th enlargement of EU: 2004 (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Slovakia, Hungary, Cyprus, Malta); 2007 (Bulgaria, Romania);

- preparation of the EU constitution (2005), its failure at referendums in France and the Netherlands;

- an attempt to create autonomous military-political structures in the EU.

6. 2007 – up to now:

- Treaty of Lisbon (2007);

- Institutional reforms;

- 2013 – 6th enlargement (Croatia);

- last stage of political integration building;

- the EU plays an important role in a global security system;

- 2020 – Brexit.

2. Foundation and institutional structure of the European Union

2.1 Fundamental EU Treaties
2.2 EU institutional structure
2.3 Decision-making process in the EU institutions

2.1 Fundamental EU Treaties

Treaty of Paris 1951

On April 18, 1951, in Paris, Italy, Germany, France and the Benelux countries signed the first European Treaty establishing the **European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)**. The Treaty entered into force on July 25, 1952.

The main objective of the Treaty was:

- to eliminate various barriers for trade;

- to create a common market for the free movement of coal and steel products of the Member States;

- to meet the needs of all citizens of the Community, regardless of their nationality.

The treaty provided for the **free movement of capital and labor force** in both sectors.

To achieve these goals, the treaty laid down certain rules on investment and financial assistance, production and prices, agreements and concentrations of commercial and industrial enterprises, as well as on transport and Community institutions, including the **High Authority** and a special **Council (of Ministers)**, whose decisions would be binding on all member states.

Being quite ambitious despite its limited scope, the ECSC Treaty established the **European Assembly** and the **European Court of Justice**. In fact, the widely recognized intentions of the founders of the ECSC were that it was to be an experiment that could gradually expand to other economic areas and culminate in the formation of a "European Federation."

Treaties of Rome 1957

The Treaty establishing **the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom)** was signed in Rome **on March 25, 1957**. It entered into force on January 1, 1958.

The purpose of the treaty was:

- to create a common market for nuclear materials andequipment,

- to establish common legislation in the nuclear field,

- to introduce a common system of supply of fissile materials

- to elaborate a system of control over the peaceful use of nuclear energy and common standards of nuclear safety

- to protect worker health from ionizing radiation.

The main components of this treaty were the coordination of research programs of the member states and a joint research program implemented in the Joint Research Center, which was to develop technologies and stimulate nuclear energy production in Europe.

Although Euratom was in the spotlight during its formative years, the association has experienced manyups and downs, both due to disappointment with the economic prospects for nuclearenergy and ambitious plans by some member states to develop their own nuclear industries, and not just for purely civilian purposes.

The Treaty establishing **the European Economic Community (EEC),** signed simultaneously with the Euratom Treaty in Rome **on March 25, 1957**, also entered into force on January 1, 1958.

Because of its nature and scope, it dominated the others (until it was replaced by the European Community Treaty). While the first two treaties were more

specific, detailed, and rigid "legal treaties," the EEC Treaty was a "framework" treaty.

In addition to the "automatic" provisions aimed at establishing a customs union, it limited itself to setting certain objectives and providing direction on general guidelines for common policies to be followed in certain areas of economic activity.

Signing of the Treaty of Rome, March 25, 1957. Keystone—Hulton Archive/Getty Images

The essential task that the Treaty of Rome assigned to the Community institutions was **to create a common market between the member states**.

This included:

- the achievement of a customs union, which would include, on the one hand, the abolition of customs duties, import quotas and other trade barriers between member states, and, on the other hand, the introduction of common customs tariffs (CCTs) with third countries;

- the realization, though the harmonization of national policies, of four fundamental freedoms: **free movement of goods, free movement of workers, freedom of entrepreneurship and provision of services** by independent individuals and companies, and free movement of capital.

The Treaties of Paris and Rome provided for the establishment of **different executive bodies.** The latter were united by the **Treaty of April 8, 1965**, which established a single **Council** and a single **Commission** of the European Communities to better manage the growing number of common policies.

Thus, from **July 1, 1967**,there was only a single **Council of Ministers** and a single **Commission**, with the latter inheriting the powers of the ECSC Supreme Authority, the EEC Commission and the Euratom Commission.

At the same time, the merger of the institutions was considered **the first stage of the unification** of the three European Communities into a single **"European Community".** This was not done at the time, but later the Treaty on European Union gave the same name to the modified European Economic Community (Article 8 of the TEU), without abolishing the other two Communities.

The Treaties establishing the Communities were somewhat supplemented in terms of their provisions on the functioning of the institutions by the Treaty on the **Accession of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom to the European Economic Community.**

This treaty, signed in Brussels on **January 22, 1972**, entered into force on **January 1, 1973**, but only for three countries, as a referendum in Norway made it impossible for it to join the EEC.

1. *The United Kingdom officially became a member of the European Communities on January 1, 1973. The decision to join the Common Market, the European Economic Community (EEC), was made by the UK's Conservative government under Prime Minister Edward Heath.*
2. *Ireland also joined the European Communities on the same day as the UK, in 1973. The accession of Ireland was seen as a way to boost the country's economy and reduce its dependence on the British market.*
3. *Denmark became a member of the European Communities in 1973 as well. The country's decision to join was a result of a positive referendum held in 1972, in which Danish citizens approved EU membership.*

In parallel with the decision to create the Community's own resources, on **April 21, 1970**, the Member States agreed to amend the treaties to increase the **budgetary powers of the European Parliament**.

Budgetary Treaties

In fact, **the first Budgetary Treaty** was signed **on April 22, 1970** and entered into force **on January 1, 1971**, but the European Parliament did not feel a significant increase in budgetary powers.

The Commission decided that the Parliament was right and put forward proposals to further expand its budgetary powers. This resulted in the signing of the **Second Budget Treaty**, which regulates the finances of the Community. This treaty was signed on **July 22, 1975** and entered into force **on June1, 1977**.

In addition to establishing a new institution, **the Court of Auditors**, it granted the European Parliament the exclusive right to return a report on the implementationof the budget to the Commission and, "if there are good reasons for doing so," to reject the entire budget.

The institutional articles of the Treaties establishing the Communities were once again supplemented by **the Treaty on the Accession of Greece** to the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community, signed **in Athens on May 28, 1979**. Thus, on January 1, 1981, the Treaty of the Nine became the Treaty of the Ten.

> *The 1981 enlargement of the European Communities, which later evolved into the European Union (EU), was another important expansion of the organization, resulting in the accession of Greece. This enlargement took place on January 1, 1981, and **Greece** became the tenth member state of the European Communities.*

On January 1, 1986, it becamethe Treaty of the Twelve due to **the accession acts of Spain and Portugal, signed on June 12, 1985**, in Madrid and Lisbon, respectively.

The Treaties establishing the European Communities received an important addition **on July 1, 1987, when the Single European Act** came into force. Complementing, in particular, the EEC Treaty,the Single Act forced the Community to take measures to gradually create an internalmarket, which was to be completed by December 31, 1992.

> 1. ***Spain*** *became a member of the European Communities on January 1, 1986. The decision to join the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) was a major step in Spain's efforts to consolidate its democratic system and promote economic development after the end of the Franco dictatorship.*
> 2. ***Portugal*** *also joined the European Communities on January 1, 1986. Like Spain, Portugal's accession was part of its broader political and economic modernization efforts. EU membership offered the country opportunities for economic growth and development.*

At the same time, it legalized **the European Council**, European cooperation in foreign policy, and socialand economic cohesion among member states. Finally, it served as the legal basis for numerous common policies, including social, environmental, and science and technology policies.

The Treaty on European Union (EU),

signed **in Maastricht on February 7, 1992**, marked a new stage in the process of creating a closer union among the peoplesof Europe. The Union was based on the European Communities and was complemented by new policy areas and forms of cooperation. The Treaty went beyond the purely economic nature of the Communities to establish a global entity.

In accordance with Article B of the EU Treaty (Maastricht Option), the Union has the following objectives:

- promoting economic and social progress that is balanced and stable, in particular by creating a space without internal borders, strengthening economic andsocial ties, creating an economic and monetary union, and finally introducing a single currency;

- asserting their own identity in the international arena, in particular, through the implementation of a common foreign and security policy, and, if necessary, theformation of a common defense policy, which may eventually lead to the formationof a common defense;

- strengthening the protection of the rights and interests of citizens of the Union's member states through the introduction of Union citizenship;

- establishingclose cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs;

- maximizing compliance with the *acquis communautaire* (the Community's legal acquis) and building on it to ensure the effectiveness of the Community's mechanisms and institutions.

The TEU covered and supplemented the previous treaties. The provisions amending the European Economic Community Treaty, which changed its name to the "Treaty Establishing the European Community (TEU)", were contained in Article G, the provisions on the European Coal and SteelCommunity Treaty were contained in Article H, and those on the European AtomicEnergy Community Treaty formed Article I.

In fact, the EU Treaty divided the European structure **into three pillars** that differed in their decision-making procedures:

- the main pillar (the European Community);
- the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) pillar:
- the justice and home affairspillar.

Even within the main pillar, the European Community, the EU has made major changes, as it has recreated certain common policies and introduced several others, such as those on education, youth, culture, health and consumer protection. It is clear that even beforethe single market was completed, member states felt the need to complement it with a single currency and enrich it with new and

strengthened common policies, thus confirming the evolutionary nature of the multinational integration process.

On January 1, 1995, the number of member states of the European Union increased to fifteen: this was the result of the accession treaties of **Austria, Sweden,and Finland** signed during the European Council meeting **in Corfu on June 24, 1994.**In addition, Norway's accession treaty was signed at the same time, but 52.8% of thecountry's population again voted against membership in the Union.

The 1995 enlargement of the European Union (EU) was a significant expansion of the organization, resulting in the accession of three new member states. The countries that joined the EU in this enlargement were:

Austria: Austria officially became a member of the European Union on January 1, 1995. The decision to join the EU was a reflection of Austria's desire to strengthen its economic and political ties with Western Europe. Austria had previously been a member of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and sought closer integration with the EU.

Finland: Finland also joined the European Union on January 1, 1995. Like Austria, Finland was looking to deepen its economic and political ties with the EU. Its accession was a significant step in aligning itself more closely with Western Europe.

Sweden: Sweden's accession to the EU also took place on January 1, 1995. Sweden had a tradition of neutrality in international conflicts, and its decision to join the EU marked a shift in its foreign policy. The country aimed to enhance its role in regional and global affairs through EU membership.

Treaty of Amsterdam 1997

On June 17, 1997, in Amsterdam, the heads of state and government of the fifteen EU countries revised the Treaty on European Union.

The Treaty of Amsterdam establishes a more democratic Europe, emphasizing member states' respect for human rights and democratic principles. It has also led to notable progressin matters relating to the free movement of their citizens, as well as made the war against organized crime more effective.

In preparation for the enlargement of the Union, the Treaty of Amsterdam deepened European integration by bringing justiceand home affairs under the Community's orbit, strengthening common foreign and security policy, and establishing new common policies, including those related toemployment and social protection.

The Treaty of Amsterdam had four main **objectives**:

- to put employment and citizens' rights at the heart of the Union. While reaffirming that Member States have a major responsibility for employment, the new Treaty gives a central role to their cooperation in tackling unemployment, which is currently the number one problem in Europe;
- to remove the last remaining obstacles to freedom of movement and strengthen security by consolidating and enhancing cooperation between Member States in the fields of justice and home affairs;
- to give Europe a more influential voice in world affairs by making the European Council (heads of state or government) responsible for formulating common strategies to be implemented by the Union and member states, and by appointing a **High Representative of the EU for CFSP (Secretary General of the Council)**, whose powers would extend to the Political Planning and Early Warning Unit;
- to make the Union's institutional structure more effective in view of future enlargement, especially in the direction of Eastern European states that are knockingon the Union's door.

The Treaty of Nice 2000

With the accession of ten new members tothe European Union, the treaties had to be updated to allow European institutions tofunction with representatives from all twenty-five members.

Therefore, the **European Council in Nice (December 7-9, 2000**) adopted the necessary amendments to the European Communities and EU treaties.

The Treaty of Nice, which entered into force on February 1, 2003, revised and replaced the Amsterdam Treaty, primarily in **four institutional areas:**

- the size and composition of the Commission,

- the "weight" of member states' votes in Council voting,

- the replacement of the unanimity principle in decision-making procedures with the qualified majority principle,

- and closer cooperation.

Regarding the composition of the Commission, it was decided that after the future enlargement of the Union, each member state will still have one

commissioner until the 27th member joins the European Union, but then the number of commissioners will be less than the number of member states.

Moreover, the powers of the Commission President are to be expanded. As of January 1, 2005, the decision-making process will be changed as follows: a qualifiedmajority will be achieved if a decision receives a certain number of votes and the approval of a majority of member states.

The qualified majority principle will replace the unanimity principle in about thirty issues, including those related to cooperation in civil justice and common commercial and industrial policies. The possibility of closer cooperation between some member states will be ensured and facilitated. Other significant institutional reforms concern the Union's legal system.

The role of Parliament has been increased in several areas.

The powers of the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance were redefined, specialized chambers werecreated, and the statutes of the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance wererevised.

The ratification of the Treaty of Nice was initially slowed down by the negative results of the June 11, 2001 referendum in Ireland. However, the problem was overcome by a second referendum held on October 19, 2002, which supported ratification.

Thus, the Treaty of Nice, named after the city where it was signed, **entered into force on February 1, 2003.** Like the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties it replaced, the Treaty of Nice actually combined the two. The first one defined the goalsand agreements regarding the European Union, namely, a common foreign and security policy. The second, concerning the European Community, defines the tasks and means of successfully overcoming the first three stages of European integration:customs union, common market, and economic and monetary union. Since citizenshave rights and obligations arising from European treaties, they can rightly demandtransparency in these texts.

However, it is the lack of clarity and technocratic ambiguity that is most often criticized in the texts of these treaties. As a result, the main Treaties of the Union are very difficult to read and understand, which is unlikely to favor them in public opinion.

The Treaty of Amsterdam, which containsconsolidated versions of the two main treaties, the Treaty on European Union (TEU)and the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC), with new article numbering, has begun to address this problem. It is expected that the text of the newconstitutional treaty, which is currently being discussed, will be clearer. The information in this book is presented according to the new numbering of the articlesof the TEU and TFEU, except when referring to previous legislation based on the original versions of the treaties.

The Treaty of Nice is only a small step in the processof ongoing reform of the Union. Recognizing the need for a deep institutional reformof the enlarged Union, the Nice European Council in December 2000 called for a new Intergovernmental Conference to propose major new treaty changes. In order to make the next Intergovernmental Conference as open and transparent as possible, **the European Council in Laeken (December 14-15, 2001)** decided to convene a Convention for the Future of Europe, chaired by former French President Giscard d'Estaing.

The Convention included representatives of governments and national parliaments of the member states, as well as all EU institutions. In order to broaden the circle of participants and involve citizens in the discussion, organizations representing civil society (social partners, business associations, NGOs, academic institutions, etc.) were given the opportunity to participate in the Forum.

At a meeting of **the European Council in Thessaloniki (June 19-20, 2003)**, the Chairman of the Convention presented the results of its work. The European Council approvedthe draft constitutional treaty and decided that it was a good basis for the work of the Intergovernmental Conference.

Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe 2004

The Intergovernmental Conference began its work in Rome in October 2003.It largely took into account the proposals of the Convention and presented its draft constitution to the European Council, which was adopted with minor changes on June 18, 2004.

The ratification of the Constitutional Treaty was to take place withintwo years of its signing on October 29, 2004 in Rome (the city was chosen to markthe signing of the original treaty establishing the European Economic Community). The Constitutional Treaty, once ratified by all member states, was to replace the existing EU treaties. The Constitution was supposed to simplify the European

structure: replacing the EC Treaties and the EU Treaties, the European Union was to be granted the status of a legal entity.

The three pillars, namely the European Community, justice and home affairs, and foreign and security policy, were merged;although special procedures in the areas of foreign policy, security and defense wereretained. It was expected that this simplification would have a positive impact on theperception of citizens who find it difficult to understand the difference between theCommunity and the Union.

When the Constitution was rejected in referendums in France and the Netherlands, the EU found itself in an institutional impasse. In orderto move forward, it was necessary to seriously simplify the structure of collective bodies, the principles and procedures of their work, and make their activities more understandable and transparent. The Lisbon Treaty is aimed at solving this dual task.

Treaty of Lisbon 2007

The Treaty amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, or the EU Reform Treaty, designed to improve the functioning of the 27-member European Union and strengthen its role and position on the world stage in the face of dramatic global changes, was finally agreed at the Intergovernmental Conference in Lisbon on October 19, 2007 and **signed at the EU Summit on December 13, 2007 in Lisbon.**

Conceived as a "toolkit",this largely innovative treaty is intended to lay the foundations for the functioning of the European Union for the next 15-20 years. The Treaty of Lisbon is intended toamend the European Union treaties to reform the EU's governance system and replaced the EU Constitution, which did not enter into force. Approval in the parliaments of 27 countries was supposed to end a 15-year discussion on political and institutional reform of the EU, which began with the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992.

The need to amend the EU's fundamental treaties was caused by thefact that in just two and a half years (April 2004 - January 1, 2007) the number of member states increased from 15 to 27, and their total population is almost half a billion people. The treaty is intended to replace the failed draft EU Constitution. TheReform Treaty established a balance between the goals and interests of the member states and the EU, giving the latter the status of a "superpower." The text of the Treaty amends three fundamental EU documents: The Treaty establishing theEuropean

Community (Treaty of Rome, 1957), the Treaty of Maastricht, 1992, and the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, 1957. After signing and ratification, the Reform Treaty ceases to exist as a single text, and the innovations are incorporated into the three documents listed above.

The Treaty was expected to enter into force by January 1, 2009, but there were complications with its ratification in such EU countries as Ireland and the Czech Republic, where 3/5 of the Parliament needs to approve it.

On 13 December 2007, José Sócrates (left), Portuguese Prime Minister and President-in-Office of the European Council, and Luís Amado, Foreign Minister and President-in-Office of the Council of the European Union, sign, on behalf of Portugal, the Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community.
Source: Traité de Lisbonne: cérémonie de signature. Ricardo Oliveira, GPM. Lisbonne: Présidence portugaise du Conseil de l'Union européenne, 13.12.2007. Couleur.
Copyright: www.ue2007.pt

2.2 EU institutional structure

The main actors of European integration are the main organs of the Community, which are called "institutions" and "consultative bodies" in the treaties. The institutions of the European Union are the result of the desire to "create the closest possible association of the peoples of Europe" based on this division of responsibilities: The Commission proposes, the Parliament advises, the Council of Ministers decides, and the Court of Justice determines the rules.

European Council

The top of the EU pyramid is the European Council. It does not have the status of a body. The European Council is one of the most important "actors" in the system of EU institutions. Its role is perhaps the most important in the work of the entire system. The European Council consists of the heads of state (the President of the French Republic, responsible for foreign and European relations) or government (prime ministers of other member states) of the EU and the President of the EuropeanCommission.

The European Council is the "architect" of the European structure. It provides the Union with the necessary impetus for development, defines general political guidelines for it, and solves the most important structural problems. The status of the European Council (initially informal) is now defined in Article 4 of the TEU.

According to this article, the European Council meets at least twice a year under thechairmanship of the head or government of the presiding member state. In practice,each presidency usually convenes one informal and one formal meeting of the European Council, which thus meets systematically four times a year. At these meetings, the Heads of State or Government and the President of the Commission are assisted by the foreign ministers and one member of the Commission.

The European Council is primarily a forum for a free and informal exchange of views between the leaders of the member states. Its driving force is the immediacy and informality that give rise to the so-called esprit de corps among Europe's political leaders. Since the European Council is a place where complex agreements can be concluded, and thus lacks the cumbersome nature that sometimes paralyzes the business of the Council of Ministers, it often acts as an appellate body for politically and economically important cases that are stalled at the ministerial level. Thus, the Council has resolved several issues that threatened the Community's solidarity and progress.

In addition, this institution has given impetus to newcommon policies and established collective responsibility of the leaders of Europeandiplomacy on major European and global issues. It should be noted, however, that heads of state or government do not adopt legal acts that would be formally bindingon member states.

Discussions among them lead to the publication of declarations that provide guidance and general directives for future Community action. These declarations have undeniable political significance, but no legal significance. They provide common policies with the political impetus necessary for their further development; however, the common policies themselves are shaped by subsequent provisions adopted in accordance with the procedures set out in the Treaties. The situation is quite different in the area of common foreign and security policy, where the European Council, in addition to establishing common strategies, can decide onjoint actions or positions that are politically, but not legally, binding on the memberstates.

European Commission

The European Commission (more commonly referred to simply as the Commission) currently consists of 27 members who are elected for a five-year term with the consent of the governments of the member states and who may not hold anyother office during that period, whether or not they are paid.

The Heads of State andGovernment appoint the President of the Commission by a qualified majority; this appointment must be approved by the European Parliament. The composition of the Commission as a whole is approved by a vote in the European Parliament.

Ursula von der Leyen
since 1 December 2019

The Parliament examines the programs and views of each Commissioner and may object to granting them certain powers within the Commission, but not to their appointment. Thus, if the Parliament objects to certain members of the Commission, the President has the option of granting them other powers or risking the rejection of the entire Commission by the Parliament.

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For the sake of the generalinterest of the Community, the members of the Commission must be completely independent in the exercise of their duties; they must not accept instructions from any government, and all governments must respect this principle and not attempt toinfluence the members of the Commission in the performance of their duties.

The Treaty of Nice stipulates that the Commission should be composed of one representative from each member state, but the number of members can be changed by the Council unanimously.

The Commission is a driving force in the process of building Europe. According to the Community's decision-making procedure, as defined by the TEU, only the Commission has the right to initiate proposals for suchdecisions. No other body or individual state can replace the Commission in this regard. Only it can amend its proposals, with the only exception being when the Council unanimously decides to do so. Building on the political momentum provided by the European Council through its declarations and, often, by the European Parliament through its resolutions, the Commission should further submitproposals to the Council and the Parliament to develop new activities within the framework of the treaties. It should be noted that the European Council declarationsand the Parliament resolutions often appear as a result of reports, again, from the Commission. The Commission's right of initiative plays an extremely important rolein the development of common policies and, therefore, in the progress of multinational integration. All common policies, all legislative acts and all Community programs have been adopted by the legislatures on the initiative of the Commission in the form of explanatory statements or legislative proposals. In its proposals, the Commission has to identify in each policy the common interests and the legitimate measures or actions it proposes; the representatives of the Member States can only replace it in this regard if they are unanimous.

This means that evenif only one state considers that an amendment to a Commission proposal supportedby the majority is against its interests, the proposal cannot be adopted by the Council with a qualified majority. It is up to the Commission itself to correct the proposal byfinding a compromise solution that is closer to the common interest. Of course, if the Commission decides that the minority is exaggerating or taking too long, it can make amendments in accordance with the wishes of the majority, which can then adopt them. In most cases,

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however, during the Council's discussions and negotiations, the Commission will repeatedly amend its proposal to encourage concessions on a particular issue and eventually reach an agreement. At the same time, the Commission can both parallelize the Community's decision-making process and speed it up (which it always does). Every year it submits about 700 proposals to the Council.

The Commission is the guardian of the Community's treaties and legal *acquis communautaire***.** One of its main tasks is to ensure that member states properly apply the provisions of the treaties and secondary legislation. For this purpose, it has been granted supervisory powers, which it exercises on its own initiative or in response to a request from a government or a complaint from individuals. If, as a result of an investigation, the Commission concludes that there has been a breach of Community law, it requests explanations from the offending state, which it must provide within a certain time limit. If the country does not satisfy the requirements or if its explanations do not convince the Commission, the latter submits a reasoned decision, which the member state must comply with within a certain time. Otherwise, the Commission refers the case to theCourt of Justice, which, in most cases, sanctions the Commission's decision and then requires the "recalcitrant" Member State to comply with Community law. Differences of opinion between the Member States and the Commission are not uncommon, but the Commission's impartiality towards the Member States has never been questioned.

The Commission is also the executive body of the Community andthus plays an **administrative role.** To achieve the goals set out in the treaties (effective functioning of the single market, control over compliance with competition rules, nuclear fuel supply, etc.), they give the Commission quite diversepowers. They are constantly expanding, as the Council grants them the powers necessary to implement a particular common policy. It is the Commission that implements the decisions of the legislative bodies (Council and Parliament) and manages the Community budget and, in particular, various Community funds, suchas the ESMU loans, the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund, the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund, the European Development Fund, and programs for scientific and technological development. These executive decisions are usually formulated by the Commission in relevant documents (regulations, directives or decisions).

The European Parliament

The first elections to the European Parliament wereheld in 1979. The number of members of the European Parliament has been growing due to the gradual enlargement of the Community/Union.

After election in 2019, the number of seats is 705. The Treaty of Nice strengthened the role of the Parliament in several ways. The scope of the co-decision-making procedure was expanded, so that the Parliament, like other institutions, can request the Court of Justice of the EU to review the compliance with Community law. Due to the fact that the members of the EuropeanParliament are directly elected by the citizens of the Union, it is the only true multinational legislative body in the world and plays an increasingly important rolein the process of European integration.

Indeed, despite the fact that, according to theoriginal treaties, the Parliament was a purely advisory body, its role has gradually increased due to the spread of political influence. Currently, the Parliament performs **functions: legislative, political, supervisory and budgetary.** The first task of theEuropean Parliament, according to the treaties that established the original Communities, i.e. consultation (when Parliament gives its opinion on the Commission's proposals),

was supplemented by the Single Act of 1987, which introduced a procedure for cooperation with the Council in many Community decisions.

The legislative function of the Parliament was significantly strengthenedby the Amsterdam Treaty. Article 192 of the TEU, in particular, states that the European Parliament shall participate in the Community legislative process using its own powers in accordance with the procedures laid down in Articles 251 and 252 (joint decision-making and cooperation).

Moreover, the Parliament has the right to give or withhold its consent to the conclusion of certain international agreements, tothe accession of new members, as well as to the Structural Funds and the Cohesion Fund. The consent procedure can be seen as a full-fledged power of the Parliament to participate in decision-making in the definition, implementation and monitoring of the Community's foreign policy.

Although the powers of the European Parliamentdo not coincide with those of national parliaments, its lawmaking role increases witheach new version of the treaties. In addition, it should be noted that national parliaments rarely use their legislative powers to the fullest extent, as they depend on the will of the parties

The composition of the European Parliament with regard to percental share of deputies for each political group, 1979 to 2019. Left to right[92];

Left-wing

Social democrats

Greens and regionalists

Liberals and centrists

Christian democrats and conservatives

Eurosceptics

Eurosceptic conservatives

Right-wing nationalists

Heterogeneous

Non-Inscrits

that support the governments that submit draft legislation to them. The European Parliament has no such limitations.

The political function of the Parliament is also very important. Since it represents citizens and isthe main European forum, the Parliament is essentially the main contractor of European construction. It calls on the other main actors, i.e. the Commission and theCouncil, to develop or change existing common policies or initiate new ones. In fact,according to the treaties, it has the right to request the Commission to submit any reasonable proposals in matters in which it considers that a Community act should be adopted.

In addition to the Commission, the European Council also reports to the European Parliament (at each of its meetings, as well as annuallyon the progress made by the Union). The Parliament exercises its supervisory function primarily over the Commission. According to the treaties, the Commissionis responsible only to the Parliament, which makes it independent of the will of national governments - all or some of them. The Commission is to report to the European Parliament, defend its positions before parliamentary committees and plenary sessions, and submit an annual "General Report on the Activities of the European Union" to the Parliament. The Parliament must approve the candidacy of the Commission's President, as well as the composition of the Commission as a whole.

In order to harmonize the terms of work of both institutions, the term of office of the Commission was also extended to five years. Moreover, the European Parliament can pass a vote of no confidence against the Commission (by a two-thirds majority) and thus force it to resign as a whole, as it threatened to do in March 1999. Each member of Parliament may inquire into the nature or grounds of any action taken by the Commission and demand answers by submitting questions to it orally or in writing.

Every year, the Parliament asks about three thousand questions, nine tenths of which are *The Hemicycle of the European Parliament in Strasbourg during a plenary session* addressed to the Commission and the rest to the Council. These questions allow the Parliament not only to monitor any innovations in a particular Community policy, but also to often initiate these innovations.

The European Parliament also monitors the activities of the European Council, thus receiving reports on its actions, positions and decisions taken at each of its meetings. The European Parliament appoints an Ombudsman authorized to consider complaints from all citizens of the Union, natural or legal persons residing in or carrying on business in a Member State. The complaints concern mismanagement by Community institutions or bodies, with the exception of the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance (if they are acting within their competence). If the Ombudsman establishes that there has been a breach in the activities of the EU institutions, he sends a request to the relevant institution, whichmust provide the Ombudsman with its views on the case within three months.

The European Parliament has the right to form an ad hoc temporary committee to investigate controversial issues or examples of mismanagement in theimplementation of Community law. Such procedures can help bring European institutions closer to citizens.

Budgetary functions of the Parliament. The Parliament gives its consent to all important decisions concerning the expenditures to be borne by the Community

budget. It is the Parliament that accepts or rejects the budget proposed by the Commission at thefinal stage of the reconciliation procedure, which divides the budgetary process between the Parliament and the Council.

In this way, the Parliament exercises democratic control over the Community's resources. It also oversees Community spending, as it has the power to relieve the Commission from managing the Community budget. Such powers of the European Parliament in the budgetary sphere are similar to those of national parliaments, which, although they have broader powers under their constitutions, often use themless decisively, given the dependence of most members of national parliaments on the ruling party or ruling coalition.

The Left: 37 seats   S&D: 143 seats   Greens/EFA: 72 seats   Renew: 101 seats EPP: 177 seats   ECR: 66 seats   ID: 62 seats   NI: 47 seats

The political groups in the European Parliament

- Group of the European People's Party (Christian Democrats)
- Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament
- Renew Europe Group

- Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance
- European Conservatives and Reformists Group
- Identity and Democracy Group
- The Left group in the European Parliament - GUE/NGL

The President is essentially the speaker of the Parliament and presides over the plenary when it is in session. The President's signature is required for all acts adopted by co-decision, including the EU budget. The President is also responsible for representing the Parliament externally, including in legal matters, and for the application of the rules of procedure. The President is

Roberta Metsola as President of the European Parliament until 2024, with 458 votes in the first round

elected for two-and-a-half-year terms, meaning two elections per parliamentary term. The current President of the European Parliament is Roberta Metsola, who was elected in January 2022.

The Council of the European Union

The Council of the European Union, which consists of the ministers of the member states and is usually referred to as the Council of Ministers or simply the Council, is the main body in the decision-making structure of the Union. The European Council adopts secondary legislation either onits own (in a few issues) or jointly with the European Parliament (nowadays this practice is spreading to a growing number of areas), based on proposals from the Commission.

In practice, important decisions are taken either unanimously, regardless of the size of the country, and each country has the possibility to block the integration process, or by a qualified majority, in particular on issues that are considered with the participation of the European Parliament in the decision-makingprocess.

Meeting place in Brussels, Belgium

The term "Council" is rather abstract, as there are actually **16 specialized councils:** a council on general issues, agriculture, economy and finance, social and labor policy, etc. Each specialized council is composed of relevant ministers and has its own meeting schedule. Some councils hold monthly meetings, such as the specialized councils for general affairs, foreign policy, and agriculture, etc. Other councils meet three or four times a year, such as the councils for economy and finance, social policy, transportation, and budget. Other councils meet for joint meetings on a routine basis.

This applies to councils on industry, energy, regional development, and fisheries. In some cases, two or three councils hold joint meetings. Although Commission proposals are discussed in the specialized councils, decisionsagreed by all Member States can be adopted without discussion ("agenda item A") within any specialized council.

This is usually the case in the General Affairs Council, which is composed of the foreign ministers of the member states. The latterare the main representatives of the member states in the Council. The Council's presidency changes every six

months on an alphabetical basis. Thus, the Council and its meetings are chaired by the foreign minister of the country holding the EU presidency.

The advantage of the rotating presidency is that it allows each country to implement common policies based on the Commission's proposals in the most effective way, thus stimulating competition among member states in achieving the goals of European integration. The effectiveness of the presidency is in fact measured by the number of common policies launched during this time.

An important role in preparing the Council's deliberations is played by the **Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER)**, which is responsible for the day-to-day running of the Council and performs the functions assigned to it by the Council itself. In the case of a proposal, report or memorandum submitted by the Commission, the Council entrusts its consideration to either the Committee of Permanent Representatives or the Special Committee on Agriculture (SCoA), if it concerns agricultural issues. The key to COREPER's work is the coordination of activities at the technical and political levels, which is carried out through working groups of national officials who consider each issue and submit relevant reports.

The COREPER itself is divided into two parts:

COREPER 1 consists of deputy permanent representatives and deals with technical issues, while

COREPER 2 consists of ambassadors and deals primarily with political issues.

The Council's General Secretariat assists the COREPER and the relevant working groupsin fulfilling their tasks, and the European Commission participates in all meetings to explain its position. Having considered a particular issue, the COREPER either submits a report to the Council, thus preparing the ground for discussion, emphasizing the political aspects that deserve special attention, or, in case of unanimous agreement between the Permanent Representatives and the Commission,the COREPER recommends the adoption of the prepared text "as item A", i.e., adopted without discussion. In both cases, the Council's work is facilitated by COREPER.

The Court of Justice

The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), or the European Court of Justice, sits in Luxembourg.

The number of judges corresponds to the number of member states of the European Union, this number must be odd; inaddition, the Court includes nine advocates general.

The functions of the latter are to conduct in-depth research on specific issues and to present impartial opinions to the Court.

Both judges and advocates are appointed for a six-year term by mutual consent of the member states.

The competence of the **Court of First Instance (CJI)** of the European Communities includes consideration of all applications filed by legal entities and individuals, as well as cases in the field of agriculture, fisheries, European structural funds (regional, social), transport and state aid to enterprises. Decisions of the Court of First Instance may be appealed in accordance with the provisions of European law to the European Court of Justice.

The main task of the European Court of Justice is to guarantee the observance of law in the interpretationand application of the provisions of treaties, legal acts and relevant decisions of theCouncil, Parliament or Commission of the EU. In the Community of States, the interpretation and application of common rules may differ from country to country,subject to the control of compliance by national courts. Community law is not applied by member states to the same extent.

Acting as the supreme court of the Communities, the European Court of Justice not only provides a comprehensive interpretation of Community law, it also ensures that all EU Member States and theircitizens comply with it. Apart from the common tendency of Member States to interpret Community law in their own interests, Community law is a new type of law and usually not well known.

National judges act as judges of first instance of rules and conduct relating to Community law. They have the right to request the European Court of Justice to give preliminary opinions on the interpretation or assessment of certain provisions of Community law. Usually, consideration of suchrequests for preliminary opinions is not mandatory.

However, in cases wherenational judicial remedies have been exhausted, i.e. the court that was supposed to apply Community law is the last instance, consideration of the request is consideredmandatory. By applying the mechanism of preliminary opinions, the European Courtof Justice plays the role of a legal council whose decisions are binding on the partiesconcerned.

National courts often resort to such requests for preliminary opinions, which encourages their cooperation with the European Court. Disputes falling underthe Court's unlimited jurisdiction include, in particular, cases involving non- compliance with Community law or the interpretation of competition rules providedby the Community. On appeal by firms or undertakings that have been sanctioned by the Commission, the Court assesses the Commission's decision and the appropriateness of the penalty imposed. The Court also examines cases that questionthe Community's public responsibility due to damage caused by one of the institutions or its staff in the performance of their duties. The judgments of the European Court of Justice, the most important of which are given in the references (to this book), reflect the vitality of Community law. They give strength to EU law and give it the necessary weight in its relations with governments, national judiciaries, parliaments and citizens.

The decisions and interpretations of the European Court of Justice contribute to the formation of genuine European law, which is followed by all European institutions, Member States, national courts and every citizen. The bodies involved in the decision-making process often amend certain ambiguous provisions of European law to bring them closer to the case law of the European Court. In this way, the Court plays an important role in the processof European integration.

European Court of Auditors

The Second Budget Treaty provides for the establishment of the European Court of Auditors as a body exercising external oversight over the implementation of the Community budget. The number of its members is determined by the number of Community member states, and they are appointed by a unanimous decision of the EU Council after consultation with the European Parliament. In the Amsterdam Treaty, the provisions on the European Court of Auditors were moved from the financial provisions to the institutional ones, which means that its role is growing.

The Declaration annexed to the Treaty on European Union calls on the other Community institutions, together with the European Court of Auditors, to consider all possible ways to enhance the effectiveness of its functioning. Such an increase in the importance of the European Court of Auditors demonstrates the desire of European institutions and governments of member states to expand and improve financial control. In fact, this is due to the growth of the Community budget, which is the result of the development of various common Community policies discussed in this paper.

The European Court of Auditors oversees the accounts of all administrative costs and revenues of the Community and all bodies established by the Community, such as the European Training Center and the European Fund for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions. The Chamber verifies the legitimacy of the income and expenditure received and monitors the financial management of the Community budget, especially by the Commission. The European Court of Auditors can also order an audit on special issues and present a decision at the request of any European institution. Finally, the Chamber is also empowered to investigate the activities of a Member State carried out on behalf of the European Union, such as the collection of customs duties or the management of the allocations of the European Agricultural Stewardship and Guarantee Fund. The special reports of the European Court of Auditors are considered a valuable contribution to the

parliamentary debate on the processing of the Commission's recommendations in the budget execution process.

2.3 Decision-making process in the EU institutions

The founding treaties of the Communities define the objectives to be achieved, contain the procedures to be followed, outline the timeframes for achieving the objectives and establish the institutional framework that lays the foundations for theunique legislative system and decision-making process within the Communities. The Community decision-making process is in fact a unique combination of technocraticproposals by the Commission, developed with the active participation of experts from all Member States, and political decisions by the Council, which represents thegovernments of the Member States, usually in conjunction with the European Parliament, which represents the peoples of the Union. Statements such as "decisionsmade by Brussels technocrats" (referring to the Commission) are extremely misleading.

In reality, technocrats only make recommendations to the Community on the need for a decision, but it is the political institutions representing democratically elected governments (the Council of Ministers) and citizens of the Member States (the European Parliament) that make the decision. Common policiesare the result of an intensive negotiation process between the main participants in a multinational integration network. More often than not, common policies are not able to satisfy the national interests of all member states, in which case the negotiation process is centered on key actors to find a compromise acceptable to asmany member states as possible.

As we have already noted, the initiative for decision-making within the Community belongs to the Commission. It prepares all proposals for regulations, directives and decisions of the Council. In particular, the Commission plays a political role by choosing and preparing the foundations for the development of the Community, but it also plays a technocratic role, as its proposals are based on scientific and technical principles. Moreover, the European Commission is responsible for determining whether the proposals are in the common interest or theinterest of the Community. To be sure that its proposal will be approved, the Commission must take into account the often divergent interests of the Member States and seek to find and publicize the common interest. If the Commission fails

to articulate the common interest or if it refuses to amend its proposal in the light of the views of the other Community institutions, then all Member States, with full agreement within the Council, must find another definition of the common interest to guide a particular common policy. Such cases, however, are very rare.

After adoption by the Commission, depending on the specific procedure, the proposal is submitted either to the European Parliament and the Council for their decisions, or to the Parliament, which gives its opinion, and the Council, which gives its decision, and, very often, to the Social and Economic Committee or the Committee of the Regions, which gives its opinion. Detailed discussions of the Commission's proposal are initiated within working groups of relevant experts from member states that prepare the Council's decision on the proposal, as well as within relevant parliamentary committees, expert groups of the Social and Economic Committee and the Committee of the Regions. Interest groups at the national and supranational levels are involved in the preparatory work and lobby technical and political experts, and, in the case of issues of particular importance, public opinion. As a result of the interaction of these actors, representing all Member States and all stakeholders, the formulation of the common interest contained in the Commission's proposal is endorsed or amended. The text is adopted by the Council, either alone or jointly with the European Parliament (within the framework of the co-decision procedure), taking into account all national, professional and other interests expressed at different stages of the long preparatory process.

Undoubtedly, the common interest of the Community should not contradict the "key interests" of any Member State, but the definition of such an interest is inevitably subjective. Each member state has a natural tendency to exaggerate its own problems as opposed to those of other countries. In other words, the decision-making process within the Community often gets into a deadlock, and it is worth emphasizing that the joint mediation efforts of the Commission and the President of the Council are aimed at avoiding such situations. On the other hand, the countries that form the majority should be prepared to make certain concessions in order to attract the minority states. At the same time, member states with extreme or isolated views should realize that the overall benefits of a common decision are more important than individual interests. Even if the interests of their national governments prevail, Council members must respect the goals and needs

of the European Union as a whole. This is the difference between the Council and an intergovernmental conference.

The European Parliament's involvement in the Community's decision-making process is strengthened through two new procedures: the co-decision-making procedure and the procedure for cooperation with the Council of Ministers. Article 251 of the TEU outlines the procedure for joint decision-making by the Council and the European Parliament. The provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty have significantly expanded the scope of this procedure and now cover almost all areas of activity, including employment and social policy, as well as areas covered by previous treaty provisions, such as the internal market, the right to carry out businessactivities, the right to provide services and environmental policy. Under the co- decision-making procedure, the Council adopts "common positions" by a qualified majority, which the Parliament can support, reject or amend. In cases where the Council does not agree with the additions and amendments made by the Parliament, a reconciliation committee is formed with an equal number of representatives of both institutions to reach an agreement on their positions. Sometimes, if a compromise solution is not found, the Parliament rejects the draft decision by an absolute majority of votes cast.

Ordinary procedure of the legislature of the European Union

Thus, the Parliament has the final say in this legislative procedure. Article 252 of the TEU sets out the cooperation procedure by which the Parliament is involved in the legislative process: it introduces two readings in the Parliament and gives it the right to amend the Council's common position. In this procedure, the European Commission plays the role of arbitrator, as it can approve some or all of the Parliament's amendments and additions to its proposal, which already contains the Council's amendments. However, the Council makes the final decision and may, acting unanimously, reject the amended Commission proposal. This procedure is currently limited to a few issues. According to the treaties, the Council's decisions are taken either unanimously, in which case a member state has a veto, or by a qualified majority.

The Treaty of Nice provides that, as of January 1, 2005, a qualified majority will be achieved when a decision receives a certain specified number of votes and is approved by a majority of member states. Moreover, any EU member state may request verification of whether the qualified majority is 62% of the total population of the European Union. If this ratio is not proven, the decision will not be considered adopted. Member states should develop a common position on this issue during negotiations on the admission of new members. The provision for a qualified majority should be included in the accession treaties. While the new qualified majority voting system opens the way for the enlargement of the Union, it hardly improves the efficiency and transparency of the decision-making process itself. This fact raises concerns about how such a voting system will function in a 27-member Union. To prevent cases of blocking by one or two states of the Union's progress in certain areas, the Amsterdam Treaty stipulates that member states seeking closer cooperation with each other must do so within the framework of the institutions, procedures and mechanisms set out in the treaties.

The conditions for such rapprochement may include:

- cooperation to achieve the objectives and protect the interests of the Union;
- respect for the principles and institutional structure defined by the treaties;
- rapprochement as the last resource;
- cooperation concerns the interests of at least a majority of the Union's Member States and is open to other members;
- does not contradict the legal *acquis communautaire*.

The Treaty of Nice has strengthened and facilitated the possibility of closer cooperation. In particular, according to its provisions, there must be at least eight countries that can establish closer cooperation. Other changes relate to individual EU pillars. In the areas regulated by the ENP Treaty, the *veto* mechanism has been abolished; the Parliament's consent is required to establish closer cooperation in anyarea under the joint decision-making procedure.

With regard to the common foreignand security policy, the possibility of closer cooperation is envisaged for the implementation of joint actions and common positions (except for security and defense policy); decisions on closer cooperation are taken by a qualified majority (with the right of a member state to withdraw from this cooperation in case of emergency). For cooperation in the field of home affairs and justice in criminal matters, the possibility of veto has been abolished.

3. Development of political cooperation of European communities. Founding the CFSP

3.1 Development of political cooperation of the European Communities member states
3.2 Forming the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy

3.1 Development of political cooperation of the European Communities member states

Self-reflection questions:

- *What were the initial goals of political cooperation among European Communities member states, and how did they evolve over time?*
- *Consider the challenges and crises that European Communities member states faced during the process of integration, such as the Empty Chair Crisis and the rejection of the European Defense Community (EDC).*
- *Reflect on the significance of key treaties and agreements, such as the Treaty of Rome, the Single European Act, and the Maastricht Treaty, in the development of political cooperation.*

The efforts made by the Community to add a political dimension to economic integration date back to the first years of its existence. The first attempts to introduce a European foreign and security policy into the integration process were made in the early 1950s. On October 24, 1950, the head of the French government, R. Pleven, presented to the National Assembly a detailed plan for the creation of a "European army closely tied to the economic and political institutions of a united Europe."

Pleven's plan envisaged a "complete merger of personnel and armaments" of Western European countries into an army "under a single European political and military leadership." This army was proposed to be formed from "European divisions, each

On 17 March 1948, in Brussels, the Foreign Ministers of Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom sign the Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence. This Treaty leads to the establishment of Western Union. From left to right: Paul-Henri Spaak, Georges Bidault, Joseph Bech, Baron Carel Godfried van Boetzelaer van Oosterhout and Ernest Bevin.

Source: Union de l'Europe occidentale - Secrétariat général, Rue de l'Association, 15, 1000 Bruxelles.
Copyright: (c) WEU Secretariat General - Secrétariat Général UEO

consisting of small units of different nationalities". In December 1950, the NATO Council agreed to further develop the "European Army" project.

At the same time, a decision was made to liquidate the Western Alliance military organization, as it was absorbed by NATO. The Americans were determined to bring the armed forces of their Western European NATO partners under their direct control. In February 1951, on the initiative of the French Prime Minister, negotiations began on the creation of the European Defense Community (EDC).

On 27 May 1952, in Paris, Konrad Adenauer, Paul Van Zeeland, Robert Schuman, Alcide De Gasperi, Joseph Bech and Dirk Stikker (from left to right) sign the Treaty establishing the European Defence Community (EDC).
Source: L'armée européenne est née à Paris. Paris: Keystone, 27/05/1952. Noir et blanc.

The Treaty on the European Defense Community was signed on **May 27, 1952**, by the six members of the European Economic Community (Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, France, and Germany). It provided for the formation of the EEU armed forces from the contingents placed at its disposal by the member states. These states were obliged not to create or maintain national armed forces, with the exception of troops intended for use in non-European territories (i.e., colonies), French occupation forces in West Germany, and personal protection of heads of state.

Unlike the original project, the integration of the armed forces was envisaged at the corps level, which allowed for the creation of national commands of large military formations - divisions. Thus, the French did not get the desired strict control over Germany's rearmament. At the same time, the creation of the EEU seriously limited the national independence of its members. Almost simultaneously (May 10, 1953) the same "Six" prepared a draft treaty on the European Political Community.

However, the treaty on the EDC was rejected by the French National Assembly on August 30, 1954, and did not enter into force. After that, the six abandoned the second draft. The only purely European structure in the military-political sphere at

that time was the Treaty on Economic, Social and Cultural Cooperation and Collective Self-Defense, signed on **March 17, 1948**, in Brussels by Great Britain, France and the Benelux countries (**The Brussels Pact**).

It was used to include Germany in the system of military and political commitments of **Western European countries** as soon as possible. On **October 23, 1954,** the **Paris Agreements** were signed, amending and supplementing the Brussels Treaty. The Western Union created within its framework was transformed into the Western European Union (WEU), whose members, along with the above-mentioned countries, were Germany and Italy.

The Paris Agreements, signed on 23 October 1954, establish Western European Union (WEU). Four protocols are added to amend and complete the Brussels Treaty of 17 March 1948.
Source: Signature of the Paris Agreements. Paris: OTAN, 23/10/1954. Noir et blanc.
Copyright: Photo OTAN / NATO

The real foundations of foreign policy cooperation in the EEC were laid by the adoption of the report of the expert group chaired by **Etienne Davignon**, Director of the Political Department of the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the Luxembourg session of the Foreign Ministers of the Member States on **October 27, 1970**.

As a result, the system of European Political Cooperation (hereinafter referred to as the EPC) was created, which became an interstate mechanism for mutual information and political consultations at the level of foreign ministers (at least once every six months), prepared by the Political Committee (the "Davignon Committee") composed of the directors of political departments of the (Ministers for Foreign Affairs) MFAs.

Viscount Etienne Davignon (born 1932)
Source: Étienne Davignon. Photo Parlement européen. Noir et blanc.
Copyright: Photo European Parliament

The EPC functioned outside the formal framework of the Treaty of Rome; moreover, its competence did not include defense issues. Attempts to overcome the functional limitations of the EPC and move from mere coordination of national positions to the development of a common political line intensified in the mid-1970s.

The task of moving the European Communities towards a political union, including security and defense issues, was most clearly formulated in the report on the European Union prepared by Belgian Prime Minister **Leo Tindemans** in 1975.

The 1980s saw the development of the EPC and the intensification of the WEU. Objections to the extension of the Communities' competence to political aspects of security were mostly removed only in the early 1980s. However, proposals to give the Communities powers in the defense sphere were still rejected.

Leonard Clemence Tindemans (1922 - 2014)

The proposal of the German and Italian foreign ministers, known as the **Genscher-Colombo initiative** (January 1981), to strengthen the EPC accordingly, although it brought significant results, did not solve the problem completely: the solemn **Stuttgart**

The German Liberal Foreign Minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, and his Italian Christian Democrat colleague, Emilio Colombo, proposed to weaken the veto power and make a stronger political co-operation for the EU in 1981.
Hans-Dietrich Genscher (Photo: www.hdg.de/.../index.html)
Italian politician and Treasury Minister, Emilio Colombo (1920-2013) pictured at a meeting in 1967. (Photo by Rolls Press/Popperfoto via Getty Images/Getty Images)

Declaration (1983, "Solemn Declaration on the EU") adopted by the EU countries extended the competence of the EPC only to "political and economic aspects of security".

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On **February 14, 1984**, the European Parliament adopted a draft treaty on European Union, **the Spinelli draft**, aimed at modifying the Community institutions. Despite the lack of repercussion of its content, its adoption prompted the governments of the Member States of the Communities to propose a treaty themselves, the draft Single Act, in December 1985.

This step was formalized by Article 30 of the Single European Act in 1987 (hereinafter - the SEA). In the SEA, the EU countries declared their intention to "coordinate more closely their positions in the political and economic aspects of security". For the first time, the SEA included the EPC within the single legal framework of the Community. It was envisaged that the foreign policy of the European Community and the policies agreed upon in the European Political

Altiero Spinelli (1907–1986), European federalist and rapporteur for the Institutional Committee of the European Parliament charged with drawing up, between 1981 and 1984, a Draft Treaty on European Union.
Source: Altiero Spinelli. Strasbourg: Photothèque Parlement européen, 14/02/1984. Noir et blanc.
Copyright: Photo European Parliament

Cooperation system should be interconnected, with special responsibility for this resting with the state presiding over the EU Council and the Commission.

On 19 June 1983, the ten Heads of State or Government of the Member States of the European Communities (EC), meeting in the European Council, sign in Stuttgart a solemn declaration on European Union.
Source: 1983 - Déclaration de Stuttgart. Guyaux, Jean. Bruxelles: 1983. Noir et blanc.
Copyright: (c) Jean Guyaux

The EPC mechanism was strengthened at this stage. The Commission became a full participant. Meetings of foreign ministers within the EPC were held four times a year and were attended by a member of the Commission. In addition, they were officially authorized to discuss foreign policy issues within the competence of the EPC during sessions of the EU Council.

By now, the WEU has largely exhausted itself in its former

capacity. Commitments to limit the production of certain categories of weapons in Germany and to quantitative control of all member states' stockpiles of weapons (Protocol 4 of the Paris Agreements) were successively abolished, almost completely, by the decision of the Permanent Council of the WEU of June 27, 1984.

In arms cooperation, the **Independent European Programming Group (IEPG)** was given preference. Therefore, the **Standing Committee on Armaments** was ineffective and was abolished by the Council on November 13, 1989.

Similar reasons prompted the Council to transfer almost all of its powers in the social and cultural spheres to the Council of Europe. Even earlier, in 1970-1972, in connection with the negotiations on the accession of Great Britain to the EEC, the EEC withdrew all economic functions, and the EPC system created at the same time led to a decrease in the political significance of the EEC Council (in particular, it stopped meeting on the eve of sessions of other international organizations, including the UN General Assembly).

However, the EPC system covered only non-military aspects of security. Therefore, over time, the Community member states again showed interest in developing military-political cooperation along the WEU line. After a long period of extremely low activity, it was "resuscitated" in accordance with the decisions of the extraordinary session of the Foreign and Defense Ministers of the participating countries on **October 26-27, 1984 (Rome Declaration of the Council of the WEU).**

From then on, the Council of the WEU began to meet twice a year at the level of foreign and (jointly or separately) defense ministers. Changes in the international situation in the mid-1980s stimulated this trend.

On February 17 and February 28, 1986, the Foreign Ministers of the twelve Member States of the European Communities (EC) signed the Single European Act (SEA) in Luxembourg and then in The Hague. On July 1, 1987, the SEA entered into force.
Source of image: daylife.com

J. Chirac, who was then the Prime Minister of France, addressed the WEU with a proposal to develop a Western European charter of security principles. As a result, on October 26, 1987, the Council of the WEU in Hague adopted the so-called "Platform on European Security Interests", which was also approved by the NATO Council. It was in line with the Rome Declaration's policy of developing the European dimension of security while strengthening Atlantic solidarity. On November 14, 1988, a protocol on the accession of Spain and Portugal to the WEU was signed (entered into force on May 27, 1990).

The increased ability of the WEU to ensure coordination of positions and practical interaction of member states in military-political and defense issues was demonstrated during the Iran-Iraq war (April 1988) and the Gulf War (August 1990 - April 1991).

Along with active political activity during this period, the WEU for the first time in its history used Article VIII.3 of the amended Brussels Treaty, ensuring coordination of member states in conducting joint military operations.

3.2 Forming the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy

Self-reflection questions:
- *What historical events and challenges have shaped the development of the CFSP?*
- *What were the original objectives of the CFSP, as outlined in the Maastricht Treaty and subsequent treaties?*
- *Reflect on key milestones in the development of the CFSP, such as the establishment of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the European External Action Service (EEAS).*

The EPC envisaged regular consultations of foreign ministers and constant contacts between their agencies. Despite this, member states often acted in isolation, and Europe's common interests were not properly represented.

However, in the face of political crises such as the Gulf conflict, the civil war in Yugoslavia, and the collapse of the Soviet Union, European partners began to seek a common policy even before the Treaty on European Union was signed. Community observers were sent to Yugoslavia and a peace conference was convened on the issue. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Community defined the general

conditions for the recognition of new states. However, these crises showed that the Community's foreign and security policy mechanisms were not effective enough.

Heads of state and government, as well as foreign ministers, came to the conclusion that a coordinated policy was needed. Along with the reform of the European Community, the decision-making process within the EPC was improved, but all decisions had to be made only unanimously. Security issues were limited to political and economic aspects.

At the next stage, the EU countries focused their efforts on transforming the EEC into a system of common foreign and security policy (CFSP), which was established by the Maastricht Treaty (the second pillars of the EU's "three pillars").

Now, while all Community institutions are involved in the first pillar, decisions in the other two areas are made by the Council: The Commission plays a supporting role, while the Parliament and the Court of Justice are not involved in this process at all. In addition, some decisions made within the "second pillar" must be implemented by an organization that is not part of the European Union and not bound by its founding treaties - the Western European Union, which in turn relies on NATO's operational and material capabilities.

On February 7, 1992, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Finance of the twelve Member States of the European Communities (EC) signed the Treaty on European Union (EU) in Maastricht. It entered into force on November 1, 1993.
Source: Towards European Union. Lambiotte, Christian. Maastricht: Commission européenne, 7/02/1992. Couleur.
Copyright: European Commission Audiovisual Library

However, as a compensation, the Maastricht Treaty significantly expanded the rights of the European Parliament within the "first pillar" by establishing the so-called "co-decision" procedure, through which the Parliament can negotiate with the Council on an equal footing and even exercise the right of veto in making certain types of decisions.

The European Parliament can exert a significant moral and political influence on the second and third pillars, making them more than mere intergovernmental

cooperation. However, in general, the institutional heterogeneity of the "three pillars" makes the functioning of the European Union as a conceptually unified whole extremely difficult. These deep internal contradictions are not accidental, as two qualitatively different and in many ways opposite principles clashed during the development of the Maastricht Treaty: the principle of supranational integration construction and the principle of intergovernmental cooperation between sovereign states.

During the intergovernmental conference that preceded the Maastricht Summit and at the meeting of heads of state and government, these two principles failed to be harmonized. Therefore, the Maastricht Treaty did not unite the supporters of both approaches; on the contrary, it only added fuel to the fire of a sharp ideological struggle that has been going on for decades. The CSDP system, like the EPC, is not based on the legal framework of the Treaty of Rome, but provides for a much larger scale of cooperation.

While preserving the interstate nature of EPC cooperation, the CSDP has significantly expanded its boundaries. It now covers the entire sphere of international relations, with the exception of defense and military policy. It envisages not only

mutual consultations, as was the case in the EPC, but also the development of "common positions" of member states, which are then implemented through "joint actions" and the EU's Collective Strategies in relations with third countries and regions.

The Treaty marked the beginning of the inclusion of military-political integration within the framework of normative documents (*acquis communautaire*), and officially announced the future integration of the WEU into the EU and the formation of a common defense system in the future.

Despite the shortcomings of the EPC eliminated in Maastricht, the scope of the CSDP system that replaced it remained quite limited. The few "joint actions" undertaken by EU countries in the pre-Amsterdam period show how functionally vague the package was. It included both specific current international issues and long-term large-scale projects, both one-off and regular actions.

Among them: election observation (in russia and South Africa); the EU's diplomatic and practical involvement in the most important international security agreements.

"Joint actions" are recognized as a regular procedure in controlling the export of dual-use goods, services and technologies. They are also used for actions that require significant material and human resources (humanitarian aid in the former Yugoslavia, the establishment of the Mostar administration, the Palestinian police force, and so on).

At the same time, even this largely random choice of CSDP areas testifies in favor of this instrument of joint action of the EU countries in the international arena and confirms the need for its wider application, which was subsequently taken into account in the Amsterdam Treaty. Recognizing that the European political cooperation (EPC) system, which had been in place since the early 1970s, did not meet the new realities and requirements, the EU countries focused their efforts on its transformation into the CFSP system, which was established in 1992 in accordance with the Maastricht Treaty and is still in place today.

Due to the specifics of security and defense issues, cooperation in this area was a priori taken out of the competence of EU supranational bodies, and the CSDP inherited the interstate nature of cooperation from the EPC. This, among other things, made it possible to find ways to combine the EU's "second pillar", which

operates outside the legal framework of the Treaty of Rome, with integration along the lines of the WEU. The lack of its own instruments of military-political cooperation prompted the EU to use the increased potential of the WEU. Political-military integration was included in the context of the Maastricht process, and the WEU was documented as an integral part of the Union's development.

In **the Declaration to the EU Treaty**, the WEU identified itself as a defense component of the European Union, formally retaining the status of an independent organization. However, the mechanism of interaction, which provides for the EU to call on the WEU "to develop and implement decisions and actions of the Union of defense importance," was not specified.

In the period prior to the signing of the new **Treaty of Amsterdam (October 2, 1997),** the EU never exercised its right to appeal to the WEU. This clearly demonstrates the tactics followed by the EU/EEC countries in the field of CFSP: while opening the window for new opportunities for cooperation, they refrain from implementing it in any significant way until and if it is deemed appropriate and necessary.

Along with the coordination of the European security policy after Maastricht, the WEU defined two main areas of its practical activity (**Petersberg Declaration, June 19, 1992**): enlargement of the Union, including not only in the form of full membership, and formation of its own military "dimension" (armed forces, planning and command structures).

Subsequently, the **Kirschberg Declaration** of the Council of the WEU (**May 9, 1994)** defined the limits of associate membership in the Union. As a result, the "family of the WEU" has grown significantly: Greece joined the "nine" (1995); Iceland, Norway and Turkey were granted associate membership (1992); Denmark and Ireland (1992); Austria, Finland and Sweden (1995) got observer status; Bulgaria, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Estonia in 1994 and Slovenia in 1996 became associate partners.

Given that the possibility of moving towards a common defense policy on the basis of the CSDP depends primarily on the material basis for its implementation, the EU/EEC countries for the first time in their postwar history declared the formation of their own autonomous operational capabilities as their most important goal. Since the EU did not have the appropriate legal basis, this task was assigned to the WEU.

Having delegated the functions of collective defense to NATO, the WEU could not claim to create European armed forces under its command, which would have meant their withdrawal from NATO structures. However, European countries managed to find another solution by adopting in 1992 the concept of "Forces accountable to the WEU", which could be placed at its disposal upon request with the consent of the member states. It included more than 2,000 national and multinational military units (from ships, battalions, air units to large formations such as divisions and army corps).

At the same time, the WEU's own military capabilities are still limited and, of course, not comparable to NATO. But a solution to this problem has, in fact, already been found. According to the Declaration on the WEU, adopted as an appendix to the main text of the Maastricht Treaty, it is also recognized as "a means of strengthening the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance."

The January and December (1994) **sessions of the NATO Council approved the activities of the WEU in this capacity and expressed support for** "a European identity in the field of security and defense." This paved the way for close cooperation between NATO and the WEU based on the agreed principles of complementarity and transparency.

This, in turn, allowed European countries to achieve a breakthrough on the way to possessing military capabilities that would put their proclaimed goal of common defense on a practical track. The concept of **"Multinational Operational Forces" (MOF), adopted by the NATO Council (June 1996)**, laid the foundation for the transformation of its military structures, which, if necessary, can be used under the auspices of the WEU. The relevant legal arrangements have already been largely finalized, opening up fundamentally new prospects for the EU/EU tandem (full-scale implementation of the CSDP concept is scheduled for the end of 2004).

One of the most important achievements of the Maastricht Treaty was, therefore, the final recognition by European countries that the creation of the EU is impossible without the formation of its own "dimension" of security and military policy. The documented goal of implementing a common foreign and security policy, including the possible formalization of a common defense policy in the future, which could eventually allow for the creation of a common defense system, defined the main perspective and accelerated integration in this area. This, in turn, made it possible to include military and political integration within the WEU in the context of

the development of the European Union. The legally enshrined prerogatives of the WEU, multiplied by the new Maastricht policy guidelines of the EU, provided European countries with an outlet for building their own autonomous military potential.

4. Formation and development of the Common Security and Defense Policy

4.1 Main stages of the Common Security and Defense Policy forming
4.2 Forming the EU's crisis management function

4.1 Main stages of the Common Security and Defense Policy forming

Self-reflection questions:
- *Reflect on key milestones in the development of the CSDP, such as the establishment of the European Defense Agency and the evolution of EU military missions.*
- *How have these institutional and operational developments influenced the effectiveness of the CSDP?*

The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) enables the Union to take a leading role in peace-keeping operations, conflict prevention and in the strengthening of the international security. It is an integral part of the EU's comprehensive approach towards crisis management, drawing on civilian and military assets.

The scale and complexity of the inter-linked security threats and challenges that the EU is facing are beyond the capacity of a single Member State. That is why Member States decided to work closer together on EU level to build a strong Common Security and Defence Policy.

The Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) is a key component of the European Union's (EU) foreign and security policy. It was established to enable the EU to take a more active role in managing crises and addressing security challenges, both within Europe and in other parts of the world.

The Saint-Malo declaration was a document signed in December 1998 by British prime minister Tony Blair and French President Jacques Chirac, who met to advance the creation of a European security and defense policy, including a European military force capable of autonomous action.

Source: Tony Blair, Jacques Chirac et Lionel Jospin au Sommet de Saint-Malo. de La Mure, Frédéric. Saint-Malo: Ministère français des Affaires étrangères, 03/12/1998. Couleur.
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The formation and development of the CSDP can be traced through several key milestones:

Maastricht Treaty (1992): The foundation for the CSDP was laid with the signing of the Maastricht Treaty (Treaty on European Union) in 1992. This treaty created the framework for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which included provisions for a CSDP.

Petersberg Tasks (1992): The Petersberg Declaration, issued in 1992, identified a range of military and civilian crisis management tasks that the EU could undertake. These tasks included humanitarian and rescue missions, peacekeeping, and peacemaking.

Treaty of Amsterdam (1999): The Amsterdam Treaty, which came into force in 1999, introduced important institutional changes to the EU's foreign and security policy. It established the Political and Security Committee (PSC), which plays a central role in decision-making within the CSDP.

European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) (1999): The EU's defense policy was further developed with the creation of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) in 1999. This marked a significant step towards establishing a credible defense capability within the EU.

Treaty of Nice (2001): The Nice Treaty, which entered into force in 2003, expanded the scope of the CSDP by allowing for the development of common defense capabilities and the possibility of using NATO assets and capabilities for EU-led missions.

European Security Strategy (2003): The European Security Strategy, adopted in 2003, outlined the EU's security objectives and principles. It emphasized the importance of a comprehensive approach to security, combining military and civilian tools.

Treaty of Lisbon (2009): The Lisbon Treaty, which came into force in 2009, replaced the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) with the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). It also established the European External Action Service (EEAS), which consolidated EU diplomatic efforts.

Implementation and Development: Since the Lisbon Treaty, the EU has been actively involved in various crisis management operations, including military missions, civilian missions, and humanitarian assistance efforts. These have ranged from peacekeeping missions in the Balkans to anti-piracy operations off the coast of Somalia.

Cooperation with NATO: The EU and NATO have worked closely together on security and defense issues. The 2016 Joint Declaration on EU-NATO cooperation reaffirmed their commitment to mutual support and cooperation in addressing common security challenges.

The CSDP continues to evolve, with ongoing discussions and initiatives aimed at strengthening the EU's security and defense capabilities. These efforts include enhancing defense cooperation among EU member states, investing in defense research and development, and addressing emerging security threats.

The Common Security and Defense Policy represents the EU's commitment to maintaining peace and stability in Europe and beyond, and it plays a crucial role in the EU's efforts to address security challenges in the 21st century.

4.2 **Forming the EU's crisis management function**

Self-reflection questions:

- *Reflect on the original objectives of the EU's crisis management function, including the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP).*
- *How does the EU coordinate and cooperate with member states during crises?*
- *Consider the institutions and bodies responsible for crisis management within the EU*

The tendency towards mutual convergence of the two institutions of the "second pillar" of European integration - the CFSP (EU) and the Western European Union (WEU) – has been significantly strengthened by the Amsterdam Treaty. According to the Treaty, the procedures for adopting joint actions now extend to defense issues, unlike the Maastricht Treaty, which stipulated that these actions were not a tool for solving defense problems.

Under the Amsterdam Treaty, the European Council is empowered to "determine the principles and main lines of the common foreign and security policy, in particular in matters affecting defense". The treaty states that the WEU ensures the EU's access to the use of its potential.

The Amsterdam Agreements provide not only for the mutual desire of both organizations to cooperate, but also for the possibility of EU integration into the EU, if the European Council decides to do so. The mechanism of the CSDP system has been significantly strengthened. The basis for "joint actions" and "common positions" are the directions of the "common strategy" adopted by the European Council.

The principle of unanimous decision-making is preserved, but abstentions are not a reason for not adopting decisions. In addition, decisions on "common actions" and "common positions" are taken by a qualified majority. To ensure the successful functioning and coordination of the CSDP system, the position of the High Representative for CSDP/Secretary General of the Council was e stablished, who can also negotiate with a third party on behalf of the Council on behalf of the Presidency.

The Amsterdam Treaty opens up opportunities for the formation of the EU's own military "dimension".

The results of the EU **Cologne Summit (June 1999)**, during which an agreement was reached to ensure the EU's ability to act autonomously in case of

regional crises, became a milestone in the formation of the CSDP. It was agreed that decisions on the use of military force would be taken within the EU by consensus, and that participation in military operations by its four neutral members (Austria, Ireland, Finland, Sweden) would be voluntary.

An important aspect of the formation of the CSDP was the rapprochement between the EU and the WEU with the subsequent transfer of the WEU's powers to the Union.

The process of expanded contacts between the organizations began in Maastricht in 1992. In 1999, the first EU-WEU Parliamentary Forum was held, and the principle of harmonizing the EU and WEU presidencies was formalized.

On **March 15, 1999**, the WEU Assembly approved the **"Time for Defence"** action plan, which contained a proposal to transfer decision-making and command authority of the WEU to the European Council, giving it real military capabilities, to develop a schedule for the phased integration of the WEU into the EU, to create a common European defence within the EU and to strengthen its ties with NATO.

As a result of the meeting of the Permanent Council of the Western European Union in **Luxembourg on November 22-23, 1999,** the European Union was granted access to the operational capabilities of the WEU - the General Secretariat, the Military Staff, the Torrejon Satellite Center and the WEU Institute for Security Studies.

At the same meeting, in accordance with the decision of the EU Council of Brussels to combine the posts of High Representative of the EU for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and Secretary General of the WEU, Javier Solana was elected Secretary General of the WEU.

On November 13, 2000, the WEU Council adopted the **Marseille Declaration**, which contained the final decision to transfer most of the powers and operational capabilities to the European Union. The Marseille Declaration actually provides for the termination of the WEU as an operational organization, but preserves the Union as an institution whose competences are limited to the enforcement of Article V of the Brussels Treaty. These articles, respectively, provide for mutual guarantees of member states in case of aggression, as well as an annual report of the WEU Council to the WEU Parliamentary Assembly.

In accordance with the Marseille Declaration, the WEU Military Staff ceased to function, the staff of the WEU Secretariat was significantly reduced, and the system of political consultations between the WEU and the EU and NATO was abolished.

At the **Helsinki Summit** of the EU on **December 10-11, 1999**, the concept of CSDP was further materialized on the basis of proposals from the Franco-British and German-British summits held a month before the summit. To fulfill the "Petersberg tasks" in full, the member states pledged to be ready to deploy within 60 days and to ensure at least one year of operational activity of the European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF) of up to 60,000 people by 2003.

The summit decided to establish bodies responsible for security and defense policy. According to this decision, in 2001 the following bodies were established:

1. **The Political and Security Committee** (consisting of national representatives at the ambassadorial level, who are part of the permanent missions of the member states). The Committee prepares recommendations concerning the current regulation of a range of issues related to the CSDP, including the preparation of issues for Council meetings. In addition, in the event of a crisis, the Committee is the body of the Council that explores all options for a possible response by the Union.

2. **The European Union Military Committee** (consists of representatives of the military staffs of the member states). Functions: to provide advice and recommendations on all military matters to the Political and Defense Committee. The Military Committee determines the direction of military activities within the EU's competence. The Chairman of the Military Committee attends Council meetings when decisions on security and defense issues are taken.

3. **The European Union Military Staff** (a group of national military experts - a prototype of the future EU Military Staff) conducts military expertise on the whole range of issues related to security and defense, including military crisis management. The expertise includes situation assessment and strategic planning for the fulfillment of the Petersburg tasks.

4. **The Political-Military Group** examines the political-military aspects of all proposals submitted to the Council within the framework of the CSDP.

5. **The Committee on Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management**, which advises on non-military crisis management and conflict prevention.

The EU summit in Santa Maria da Feira (June 19-20, 2000) decided to supplement the ESDP with non-military capabilities, in particular, to create a civilian police force of up to 5,000 people in the EU by 2003.

Along with ground forces (60,000 personnel), the EUFOR will include naval and air units, as well as means of communication, command and control, information gathering and processing, surveillance and control, and remote transportation.

All EU candidate countries, as well as NATO member states that are not members of the European Union, were invited to participate in the formation of the European Union Air Force. The contribution (both in terms of personnel and material and financial support) of each member state to the formation of the European Union Army is enshrined in the so-called **"Force Catalog"** adopted during the Council of EU Defense Ministers in November 2000 in Brussels.

The above-mentioned summit approved the priority areas of non-military crisis management:

- strengthening the rule of law;

- strengthening civilian governance;

- strengthening civilian protection.

The EU Summit in Laaken (December 14-15, 2001) adopted **the Declaration on the Operational Capabilities** of the European Union's Security and Defense Policy, which stated that as a result of the further development of the European Union's Security and Defense Policy, strengthening and improving its civilian and military aspects, and establishing appropriate structures, the Union is now capable of performing some crisis management operations. **The EU summit in Seville (June 21-22, 2002)** adopted a **Declaration on the contribution of the Common Foreign and Security Policy**, including the CSDP, to the fight against terrorism.

In January 2001, the EU established official relations with NATO. A breakthrough in the relationship took place on **December 16, 2002**, with the adoption of the **EU-NATO Declaration on CSDP**.

Since then, the EU and NATO have adopted a series of documents on cooperation in crisis management, known by experts as the Berlin Plus package, which on **April 1, 2003**, allowed the EU to take over responsibility from NATO for peacekeeping in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

Group photograph of the Laeken European Council (14-15 December 2001)
Source: Photo de famille prise lors du Conseil européen de Laeken (14 et 15 décembre 2001). Laeken: Conseil de l'Union européenne, 14-15/12/2001. Couleur.
Conseil de l'Union européenne. [EN LIGNE]. [s.l.]: [s.d.]. Disponible sur http://ue.eu.int.
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The Berlin Plus arrangements include four elements:

-    guaranteed access of the EU to NATO operational planning,

-    assumption of NATO capabilities and joint capabilities that can be made available to the EU,

-    options for NATO's European Command for EU-led operations, including the development of the European function of the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSCE), and

-    adaptation of NATO's military planning system to include the possibility of providing forces for EU operations.

The Berlin-Plus arrangements are being implemented in the framework of Operation Concordia in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, where EU forces are being used for the first time.

5. Formation of the military dimension of the CSDP

5.1   EU military and police missions and operations. Cooperation with NATO
5.2   Pan-European movement: causes, main ideas and development.

5.1 EU military and police missions and operations. Cooperation with NATO

Self-reflection questions:
- *What do you perceive as the primary purposes and objectives of EU military and police missions and operations?*
- *How do these missions contribute to regional stability and peacekeeping efforts?*
- *How does the EU's involvement in military and police missions align with emerging global challenges?*

Since 1992, the European Union has emphasized political, economic and social cooperation with the Balkan states in its policy, and only with the development of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) in the early 2000s did the EU begin to take over the function of crisis management in the security and defense sphere from NATO in the Western Balkans with the prospect of including the states of this region in the European integration process.

The EU began its peacekeeping activities in the Balkans with the deployment of the European Community Observer Mission to the Western Balkans in July 1991, consisting of 120 international observers who worked with 75 local specialists.

This mission performed a supportive function in relation to the actions of EU member states and shaped effective EU policy in the region by collecting information and analyzing the situation, monitoring the political and security situation, observing borders, the development of interethnic relations, and controlling the situation with refugees. Subsequently, on December 22, 2000.

The mission evolved into the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) Observer Mission, headquartered in Sarajevo, and covering Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia Serbia, Montenegro, Albania and Macedonia. It was this observer mission that prepared the launching pad for further operations carried out by the EU within the framework of EUBAM The Republic of Macedonia (hereinafter - Macedonia), proclaimed in November 1991 (a member of the UN since 1993 under the name of

the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia at the insistence of Greece, which has the Macedonia region in its composition) is the only Yugoslav republic that has seceded from the FRY without bloodshed.

In a state where almost a third of the population is Albanian, during 1991-1998 the so-called "Albanian factor" made itself felt, but the Macedonian government managed to resolve the issues related to it.

As a result of the parliamentary elections in October 1998, a coalition government was formed from representatives of the Democratic Party of Macedonian National Unity and the Democratic Party of Albanians. Relations between the EU and Macedonia were aimed at expanding economic and humanitarian ties.

In 1996, Macedonia joined the PHARE program, shortly afterwards in 1998. A cooperation agreement was signed, under which Macedonia received preferential terms for trade with the EU. In March 2000, preparations began for the signing of the Stabilization and Association Agreement. In 1992-1998, the UN peacekeeping force was deployed in Macedonia to prevent the conflict from spilling over from neighboring countries of the former Yugoslavia.

In early 1999, the mandate for the UN peacekeeping mission could not be extended due to China's veto in the UN Security Council, as Macedonia officially recognized Taiwan. Due to the deteriorating situation in neighboring Kosovo and the resulting spread of separatism and extremism in Macedonia, it was decided to replace the UN forces with NATO troops. Macedonia has been building relations with NATO since 1996, when it signed the Agreement on the Status of NATO Forces in Macedonia and became a member of NATO's Partnership for Peace program.

After the opening of the Military Rescue Force Command Center in Macedonia in 1998 to assist the OSCE International Verification Mission in Kosovo, the International Peacekeeping Force in Kosovo (KFOR) under NATO command was deployed in 1999. According to researchers, the recognition of the Kosovo crisis and the withdrawal of UN forces from Macedonia marked the beginning of the Americanization of Macedonian politics [4]. In the spring of 1999, as a result of the Kosovo conflict, refugees, fighters, and weapons poured into Macedonia.

In the fall of 1999, the National Liberation Army (Ushtria Çlirimtare Kombëtare) was re-established an Albanian armed formation led by Ali Ahmeti,

whose goals were to gain equal rights with Macedonians for the Albanian population within the confederate Macedonia.

Known as the Macedonian Cheka, in early 2001 the Cheka began to engage in open clashes with the Macedonian army and police. As early as March 2001, the Cheka controlled the northern and western regions of the country, the hills and mountains between Kosovo and Tetovo, at a distance of 20 km from Skopje.

On May 3, 2001, the UCK defeated the Macedonian army and police near Kumanovo. The Macedonian government did not receive the expected support from NATO forces, the situation continued to deteriorate, and Albanian parties in parliament demanded a revision of the Constitution and the granting of the Albanian nation the status of a state-forming nation. Since June 2001 a peaceful settlement plan was discussed by Macedonian President Boris Trajkovski, who proposed to make concessions to the Albanians in order to end the inter-ethnic war. During July and early August 2001, a new constitution of Macedonia was being drafted with the help of EU representatives. The EU CSDP High Representative Javier Solana and NATO Secretary General George Robertson were jointly and individually looking for ways to resolve the crisis.

At the end of June 2001, the EU and NATO made efforts to negotiate a temporary truce between the warring parties, which resulted in the withdrawal of the Chechen fighters surrounded by government troops in Arachinovo under NATO protection. In early July 2001, the Macedonian government agreed to negotiate with Albanian leaders and to fulfill the disputed demands of the Albanian side. Former European Commissioner Robert Badinter prepared a draft of a new Constitution, which was put up for discussion.

On August 13, 2001, a framework agreement was signed in Ohrid by the Macedonian government and representatives of Albanian parties (the UCK did not participate in this procedure) - a plan for a peaceful settlement and ceasefire.

The Macedonian government introduced 15 amendments to the Constitution, which introduced significant changes to the political space of Macedonia, among which the most important were the official use of the Albanian language in the parliament, the prohibition of discrimination against Albanians in civil service, an increase in the number of Albanian police officers in areas with an Albanian population, the election of local police chiefs by community councils, the introduction of the concept of "citizen of Macedonia", the introduction of the so-

called "double majority" principle, which does not allow for the imposition of unfavorable decisions on national minorities by a majority vote in parliament, etc.

On August 15, 2001, an agreement was signed between NATO Special Representative Peter Fite and the leader of the UCK Ali Akhmeti on the voluntary surrender of weapons, ammunition and ammunition by the UCK fighters. To accomplish this task, on August 27, 2001, NATO launched Operation Essential Harvest, a 30-day mission with 3,500 troops. The main goal was to collect and destroy weapons and ammunition from ethnic Albanian groups.

The two small missions that followed, Amber Fox and Allied Harmony, were aimed at ensuring the security of OSCE and EU monitoring groups and, in the case of Allied Harvest, at assisting the Macedonian government.

5.2 Military operations in Western Balkans

Self-reflection questions:
- *How well do you understand the historical and political context of the conflicts in the Western Balkans during the late 20th century?*
- *How have international actors contributed to rebuilding and stabilizing the affected countries?*
- *Assess the contributions of military operations in the Western Balkans to regional peace and security.*

The EU's peacekeeping role in the region began to grow in 2001, which was reflected in the gradual increase in the number of EU representatives in the Western Balkans and the accelerated development of the EUBAM as a result of the US reorientation from the Balkan issue to the fight against international terrorism in the Middle East.

At the time when NATO was channeling significant resources into Afghanistan, the EU was ready to assume responsibility for the security of the Western Balkans.

Although the EU declared its desire to take over crisis management functions from NATO at the Brussels summit in June 2002, the agreement with NATO on this issue, known as Berlin Plus, was postponed until December 2002 due to Turkish opposition.

The Macedonian government formally invited the EU to take responsibility for the continuation of the NATO operation, and the EU decided to launch the operation on March 18, 2003.

Since the EU relied on NATO for planning and logistics, close EU-NATO coordination was carried out through the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and the North Atlantic Council (NAC). But, as the researchers point out, there was no complete openness on the part of NATO.

While NATO had full access to EU reports, it did not provide reports on the situation in neighboring Kosovo. The EU's Operation Concordia (fYROM/CONCORDIA) lasted from March 31 to December 15, 2003.

According to the Berlin Plus agreement, which gave the EU access to NATO's capabilities in planning operations, the operation was commanded by German Admiral Rainer Feist, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe. The operation was headquartered at the Supreme Allied Commander Europe in Mons, Belgium, and had three regional headquarters in Skopje, Kumanovo and Tetovo in Macedonia.

Twelve EU member states and 14 non-member states contributed troops. The largest contingent was from France, whose budget increased from the planned 4.7 million euros to 6.2 million euros.

The aim of Operation Concordia was to guarantee the implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement and to patrol the ethnic Albanian territories of the country bordering Albania, Serbia and Kosovo in order to prevent the resumption of ethnic violence.

From an operational point of view, the mission consisted of 22 light field communication brigades, whose duties included patrolling, reconnaissance, situation monitoring, reporting and communication. Support was provided by heavy armor and helicopter units, with additional support provided by light reconnaissance helicopter units and medical helicopters, as well as Explosive Ordnance Disposal specialists and a medical evacuation team.

At the request of the EU Special Representative in Macedonia (EUSR) Alexis Brouhns, in order to link the existing various EU instruments to Operation Concordia, the European Agency for Reconstruction (EAR) funds were made available for limited civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) projects with local liaison teams.

The EU approached the issue of peacekeeping in Macedonia in a comprehensive manner: in addition to the military mission, the European Agency for Reconstruction, the EU Observer Mission, representatives of the EU presidency in 2003 (Greece and Italy), the EU Commission delegation and the office of the EU

Special Representative (EUSR), which coordinated all instruments within the Stabilization and Association Process, were also involved.

Concordia faced a number of internal and external challenges related to coordination. The external ones concerned mainly relations with NATO. Difficulties included a complicated reporting system and the development of more convenient forms of information provision for the future.

While the EU provided NATO with full information about the operation, it did not receive reports from NATO on the situation in Kosovo, which was extremely important because Macedonian villages bordering Kosovo were involved in illegal arms trafficking and thus potentially vulnerable to the unrest that was taking place in the mountainous regions.

Instead of establishing direct contact between Concordia and NATO, the EU force commander was forced to communicate with the commander of NATO's Allied Forces South in Naples. As NATO considers Macedonia's future membership in the Alliance, it naturally maintains its presence in the country through a Senior Civilian Representative and a Senior Military Representative in Skopje to provide support for Security Sector Reform (SSR) and adaptation to NATO standards in preparation for membership. NATO's continued presence in Macedonia made it difficult for the EU to establish itself as the main security provider and the main political actor acting directly with the Macedonian authorities.

The EU's relations with the Macedonian authorities were negatively affected by incomplete coordination between EU instruments. The internal coordination that existed when the European Commissioner for External Relations Chris Patten and Javier Solana traveled together frequently in 2001 and adhered to the same political line was broken. Structural contradictions between the EU Council and the Commission, which emerged in 2003, undermined the effective implementation of EU policy in Macedonia. However, despite certain difficulties that accompanied the implementation of Operation Concordia, the EU generally considers it a success.

The Macedonian government, led by B. Traikovski, taking into account the expiration of the operation's mandate, considering the situation in the republic as relatively calm, and observing the stabilization of the situation, especially in the areas bordering the autonomous province of Kosovo, Traikovski addressed the EU with an official request for the deployment of an EU police mission.

The response was the EU's decision to conduct the EUPOL Proxima/FYROM police operation in the Republic of Macedonia. Simultaneously with the beginning of the withdrawal of military contingents, the leadership of the European Union began to deploy EU police forces in Macedonia.

The official ceremony of transferring control of the situation from European military structures to the EU police forces took place on **December 15, 2003** in the Macedonian capital Skopje with the direct participation of the Secretary General, High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Javier Solana.

Javier Solana (born 14 July 1942)

The main activities of the mission were defined as:

-         monitoring, mentoring and advising on strengthening law and order, including the fight against organized crime and smuggling of weapons and drugs;

-         practical implementation of a comprehensive reform of the Ministry of Internal Affairs;

-         operational transition and establishment of the border police;

-         building trust between the local police and the population; increasing cooperation with neighboring states in police activities.

These tasks had to be carried out within the framework of international legal acts and laws in force in Macedonia, together with the relevant ministries and departments of the republic. At the same time, the general control over the actions of the EU police forces in their areas of responsibility is entrusted to the EU Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

The Proxima mission was carried out in two phases:

-         "Proxima I" (December 2003 - December 2004) with a budget of 15 million euros and 186 police officers from 22 EU member states and 4 non-member states (Norway, Switzerland, Turkey and Ukraine),

-        "Proxima II" (December 2004 - December 2005) with a budget of 15.95 million euros and 169 international personnel (138 international police officers, 3 civilian secondees and 28 international experts) from 24 EU member states and 4 non-member states (Norway, Switzerland, Turkey and Ukraine).

The mission was directly led by Police Commissioner Bart de Hoog (Belgium), who until mid-December 2003 served as the head of the Police Department of the OSCE Mission to Macedonia. Structurally, the police mission consisted of a headquarters (30 people), a group of advisers at the Ministry of Internal Affairs (10 people) and groups of police advisers and experts at the relevant regional bodies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Moldova (160 people).

At the same time, the headquarters of the EU mission in Skopje, along with the tasks of managing groups of advisers and experts, was entrusted with the functions of maintaining interaction with the OSCE Police Mission in the Republic of Macedonia.

For the deployment of the EU mission, settlements located mainly in the western and northwestern regions of Macedonia were identified, namely: Gostivar, Tetovo, Kumanovo, Kicevo, Debar, Ohrid and Struga. In addition, the Macedonian police received assistance in hard-to-reach and remote areas of the country with the involvement of a mobile group of EU police forces.

According to the agreements reached by the EU and Macedonia, the EU police forces performed their functional duties unarmed and in civilian clothes. They were also prohibited from participating in forceful actions carried out by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Macedonian Armed Forces. Macedonia was responsible for ensuring the security of police officers of EU member states.

As part of EU-OSCE cooperation, EU police forces coordinated their actions with the OSCE mission in Skopje during the operation. At the same time, according to Western experts, the experience of joint activities of the two organizations in Macedonia could be used in the future in conducting similar operations in crisis areas of the world, including in the post-Soviet space.

In accordance with the agreement reached between the European Union and NATO, the EU police officers interacted with representatives of the Allied Forces in Macedonia. In general, the EU highly appreciated the results of both missions. This was stated by the CSDP High Representative H. Solana during the official closing

ceremony of "Proxima" in Skopje on December 15, 2005. He also noted that the end of the mission does not mean the end of the EU's support to the republic in the area of rule of law in the country.

The EU's anti-crisis regulation within the framework of the EUPM in Macedonia continued with the establishment of the EU Advisory Group (EUPAT) on December 15 for a period of 6 months, which was aimed at assisting in the field of police reform. And, as H. Solana noted in his speech, after the end of the group's activities, the EU Commission will introduce a project to support local efforts to reform the police by providing police advisers at the central and local levels.

Thus, the prerequisites for the military operation and the EU police mission in Macedonia were: the formation of the military and civilian dimensions of the EUBR in the late 1990s and early 2000.

The first ever EU military operation in Macedonia was Concordia in 2003, which was conducted in accordance with the EU-NATO Berlin Plus agreement, and the EU's close cooperation with NATO and the possibility of using NATO's potential in the first independent EU operations in the Western Balkans, as well as the socio-political situation in Macedonia in the early 2000s. Its goal was to provide conditions and a stable environment in the Republic of Macedonia for the implementation of the 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement. After the successful completion of the mandate, Concordia was replaced by the EU police mission Proxima, which was conducted until December 2005 to effectively fight organized crime, strengthen public confidence in the police, and promote European standards of policing. These crisis management operations were an important step for the EU in developing the military and civilian dimensions of the EBOP, and the experience gained from these missions will be applied and developed in the future in its numerous operations and missions in Europe, Africa and Asia.

6. The EU as a global actor in the security sphere

6.1 European Security Strategy

6.2 The global position of the EU in defense matters

6.1 European Security Strategy

Self-reflection questions:
- *How well do you understand the core principles and objectives outlined in the European Security Strategy?*
- *Reflect on the identified security threats and challenges in the ESS, including traditional and non-traditional threats.*
- *Reflect on the ESS's ability to adapt to evolving security threats and challenges.*

The Global Strategy of the EU's foreign and security policy, adopted in 2016, gave political impetus to the further development of a common institutional framework, which should encourage and stimulate the development of new defense initiatives of the European Union.

It is at this time were initiated:
- The Program of Permanent Structured Cooperation (Permanent Structured Cooperation, PESCO);
- Coordinated Annual Review on Defense, CARD);
- European Defense Fund (European Defense Fund).

Also taking into account the political guidelines of the Global Strategy, the European defense agency (EDA) together with EU member states prepared an updated Capability Development Plan, where the current audit was conducted defense potential of the EU countries, as well as 11 priorities of strengthening are proposed military capability of the EU.

Since 2020, the EU has been preparing the **Strategic Compass**, a new strategic document in the field of security and defense, which was to be built on the systematic and comprehensive cooperation of EU members in defining common coordinates and approaches to modern global and regional challenges facing the European Union. It is important that the work on the new strategic document in the EU was based on the possibilities of the new financial period 2021-2027.

The first Coordinated Annual Defense Review 2019-2020 provided an overview of the priority directions for strengthening cooperation in the field of defense. Given the priority of joint initiatives, for example, for the period until 2027, 8 billion euros

were allocated to the projects of the European Defense Fund. 2.7 billion of them is directed to joint research projects in the field, and 5.3 billion should be allocated for additional financing of joint projects to strengthen the defense capabilities of EU members.

In 2021, the European Peace Facility (EPF) was launched to strengthen the initiatives of the EU's Common Security and Defense Policy. It is an extra-budgetary instrument for financing EU initiatives within the framework of the Common Security and Defense Policy, which was first implemented in March 2021 the pre-programmed budget of the fund amounted to approximately 5.7 billion euros. Within the framework of this mechanism, there are two dimensions of directing financial resources. The first dimension is to ensure the activities of EU military missions, the second is measures to provide military assistance to third countries, including weapons. The director of the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments of the European Commission is responsible for the administration of military assistance.

In general, as of the end of 2021, the European Council in its conclusions noted the following elements of the common architecture in the field of defense and security:

• Taking into account the complex security challenges and global strategic competition, the EU will take greater responsibility for ensuring its own security and defense, pursue a course to strengthen its own capabilities to act autonomously.

• In 2022, the Strategic Compass was adopted, which offers a common strategic vision for EU instruments, including civilian and military policies.

• EU-NATO transatlantic relations are key in security and defense matters. A European Union, more capable and united in matters of security and defense, will strengthen transatlantic security, but the North Atlantic Alliance remains for its members the basis of collective defense.

It can be stated that the increase in initiatives to strengthen the common European defense potential did not significantly affect the EU's readiness for new challenges that faced the Union and its members in February 2022.

The informal meeting of the European Council in Versailles in March 2022 can be considered the starting point of a new approach to determining its coordinates in the system of ensuring common defense. EU leaders approved the Strategic Compass as a long-term document in the field of EU security and defense until 2030.

Among the ambitious projects of the Strategic Compass, it was proposed to create the EU Rapid Deployment Capacity, a military formation of 5 thousand people,

to respond to various types of crises. Along with this, it is about strengthening the effectiveness and mobility of the missions of the Common Security and Defense Policy, as well as the active use of the European Peace Fund.

The document also proposes strengthening cooperation in countering cyber and information threats, developing strategies to strengthen the role of the EU as a security actor in space and at sea. Considerable attention is paid to issues of investment in defense and security, as well as to the support of partnerships and coalitions. Unfortunately, Ukraine is not mentioned separately in the section on partnerships. Geographically, cooperation with Ukraine belongs to the region of the Eastern Neighborhood.

In addition, the **Versailles Declaration**, as a final document based on the results of the EU informal summit on **March 10-11, 2022**, pays primary attention to the development of defense capabilities. In particular, the EU leaders set national governments and European institutions the task of increasing investments in defense capabilities and innovative technologies, as well as developing additional incentives for joint investment projects at the level of EU members. The European Commission, in cooperation with the European Defense Agency, was asked to conduct a thorough analysis of weaknesses in the defense investment system.

Based on the results of the work done in May 2022, the European Commission and the High Representative of the EU presented a joint position on the analysis of gaps in investments in the defense sector and further steps to correct the situation. Unsatisfactory state of the issue of joint investment can be demonstrated by the statistics of the European Defense Agency, which indicate that the EU members spent only about 4 billion euros on joint purchases of products for military purposes, which is only 11% of the total indicator of expenditures for defense purposes. This, in turn, is 13% less than in 2019. In general, the underfunding of defense expenditures led to significant gaps in the level of the military-industrial potential of EU members, as well as a discrepancy between the state of support of the armed forces of the EU states and the scale of threats that arose from the beginning of Russia's war against Ukraine.

In July 2022, as one of the tools to correct the situation, the European Commission proposed the European Defense Industry Reinforcement through the common Procurement Act (EDIPRA) mechanism. This initiative is being developed taking into account the work of the Working Group on Joint Defense Procurement (Defence Joint Procurement Task Force), which was created by the European Commission and the High Representative in order to close the most urgent defense

procurement needs and to encourage European defense enterprises to replenish the stockpiles of weapons and ammunition that arose as a result of military support to Ukraine. Also, this instrument should be agreed with existing defense cooperation mechanisms in the EU, such as the European Defense Fund (European Defense Fund) and Permanent Structured Cooperation Program (PESCO), as well as align with the goals of the Strategic Compass.

This instrument should ensure the interest of the national governments of the EU members in the organization of joint procurement of weapons. On December 1, the EU Council agreed on a general regulatory approach for the launch of EDIPRA, which will serve as a basis for negotiations with the European Parliament. From the moment of official implementation for the period until the end of 2024, the Council of the EU proposes to allocate 500 million euros from the EU budget for joint defense procurement initiatives. The indicated joint projects should ensure critical defense needs. EU funding can only be available with the participation of at least 3 member states in a consortium. The general financing scheme can only be available when 70% of the components in defense products come from the EU and associated states (EFTA members). At the same time, the Council of the EU takes into account the fact that in order to cover urgent needs and identify a flexible approach, the EU countries have significant established practices of cooperation with transatlantic partners and other democratic states.

If EDIRPA creates short-term incentives for joint purchases, then another instrument - the European Defense Investment Program (EDIP) - should prepare a long-term foundation for joint initiatives at the level of EU states. This program should be adopted in 2023 with the beginning active implementation from 2024.

In addition, the European Commission in November proposed an updated Plan for Military Mobility 2.0 - a plan to improve the interconnection and security of infrastructure, which will contribute to higher mobility of troops and faster movement of weapons throughout the EU. Compared to the first document that appeared in 2018, the new plan is built in accordance with the Strategic Compass, where the European institutions face the task of increasing the mobility of the armed forces of the EU countries, as a result of Russia's full-scale aggression against Ukraine. This plan is not part of the construction of joint European military formations, but is designed to simplify bureaucratic procedures that significantly slow down the deployment and movement of armed formations and military equipment. It is also about improving the exchange of information between EU members, harmonizing

customs procedures and rules for the transportation of military cargo. The purpose of the plan is to strengthen the EU's ability to respond more quickly and adequately to crisis phenomena occurring near the Union's borders and in other regions. The plan should also facilitate the search for problem areas in the transport infrastructure, as well as integrate logistics corridors for the supply of fuel for military needs. Increasing mobility will contribute to strengthening cooperation with NATO partners, such as the USA, Canada, Norway, as well as strengthening dialogue with Ukraine and Moldova.

About 1.7 billion euros have been programmed in the EU budget for the needs of dual purpose transport infrastructure projects. The European Commission will direct additional resources in the amount of EUR 9 million within the framework of the European Defense Fund to support the Secure Digital Military Mobility System (SDMMS), which should ensure the communication of EU national governments when coordinating the movement of goods and personnel for military purposes.

It is worth noting that military mobility initiatives are increasingly of interest to the EU's external partners. In particular, in October 2022 Great Britain expressed its desire to join the project on military mobility within the framework of the Permanent Structured Cooperation Program (PESCO). This is already the fourth application from non-EU members to join the project coordinated by the Netherlands (previously the USA, Canada and Norway joined).

The European Union is a strategic partner of Ukraine when it comes to countering Russian aggression. With the beginning of the occupation of Crimea in February-March 2014, the official Brussels declared an unchanged position regarding the support of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine, as well as the implementation of political and economic pressure on Russia in order to encourage the Kremlin to stop aggressive actions.

At the same time, Russia's war against Ukraine for 8 years set European institutions and member states the task of strengthening their own defense and security capabilities, which would correspond to the level of new conventional and hybrid threats emanating from russia.

6.2 The global position of the EU in defense matters

Self-reflection questions:
• *How do you perceive the global role of the EU in defense matters?*

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- *How effective do you believe the EU is in mediating conflicts and fostering stability in regions of tension?*
- *Consider the EU's adaptability to emerging security threats and evolving geopolitical dynamics.*

After the start of russian aggression against Ukraine in 2014, the national defense budgets of the EU members have been constantly growing. However, this can be partly attributed to the recovery process of EU members after the financial crisis of 2008. In 2021, defense spending in the EU increased by 6%, reaching 214 billion euros, according to EU calculations. Full-scale Russian war from February 2022 gave the impetus for a potential further increase in the total defense spending of EU members by 70 billion euros by 2025. However, as the practice of hostilities and the necessary material and technical provision of the needs of the parties to the Russian-Ukrainian armed conflict has shown, these investments are insufficient to build a systematic and effective defense of the EU in the event of a possible scenario of a direct confrontation with Russia or other large-scale conventional challenges on the borders of the Union.

On the other hand, insufficient budget investments for defense needs were also supplemented by a decrease in the stockpiles of weapons and ammunition of the EU members due to the provision of military support to Ukraine. The situation has already attracted active attention from European institutions, which also suggest that national governments approach the solution of this issue systematically, relying on the capabilities of the defense industrial potential within the EU. Fragmentation can further damage common European interests.

According to the data of the **Coordinated Annual Review of Defense (CARD), published in November 2022**, prepared by the European Defense Agency, the defense planning of the EU members takes place mostly in isolation. Only 18% of investments in defense projects involve cooperation between EU member states. At the same time, the European joint developments themselves do not have a significant demand in the domestic European market. EU states are ready for cooperation at the European level, when such initiatives are consistent with their national defense plans, are beneficial for enterprises of the military-industrial complex, or strengthen strategic relations with other members of the Union. According to the European Defense Agency (EDA), Instead of time- and resource-consuming projects, national governments prefer ready-made samples of weapons, often from companies from outside the EU (mainly the USA, South Korea, Israel).

And this trend intensified with the beginning of Russia's full-scale aggression against Ukraine, which creates risks for joint European defense initiatives and also increases dependence on external players.

Unfortunately, a significant number of defense cooperation initiatives proposed by the European Commission in 2017, such as the European Defense Fund and the Permanent Structured Cooperation Program of PESCO, did not provide sufficient incentives to strengthen joint initiatives in the military field. Thus, despite the interest in individual PESCO projects, as indicated above, in general, it can be stated that the hopes of the European institutions and national governments regarding the Permanent Structured Cooperation mechanism did not justify themselves. As shown by the data on the implementation of joint projects within the Program as of 2022, most of the implemented joint initiatives cannot achieve the stated goal and a sufficient level of project capabilities. This is a result of the low involvement of EU members and the low priority of such projects in the defense plans of national governments. According to preliminary estimates, only half of the 60 projects currently under implementation will be able to demonstrate results at the end of the project cycle in 2025.

Regarding some, a decision will be made to close due to inefficiency and lack of progress in implementation. Only two projects have reached full operational capacity, the European medical command (coordinator - Germany, 18 participating countries) and the Cyber rapid reaction team (coordinator - Lithuania, 7 participating countries).

7. The European Union's enlargement to Eastern Europe

7.1 The procedure for joining the EU

Self-reflection questions:

- *What are the political, economic, and administrative criteria that a country must meet to become an EU member?*
- *What role does the EU play in guiding and assisting aspiring countries in the accession process?*
- *How does the EU support reforms and alignment with EU standards?*

Signing the Paris and then the two Rome Treaties, the six EU founding states did not have to accept any conditions of EU membership - they determined these conditions themselves. Those states that joined the EU later were in a different position. They had to negotiate with the Community institutions and member states on the procedure and conditions of their accession to the EU, taking into account the existing community law.

As integration deepened, expanded to new areas of activity, and the Community expanded geographically, these conditions and the accession procedure became more complex. They are now defined in Article 49 of the Treaties on European Union. It states that "any European State respecting the principles laid down in Article 6(1) may apply for membership in the Union". Any state is recognized as "European" if at least some part of it is located in Europe. On this basis, Turkey, for example, which is preparing to join the EU, is considered a European country.

In 1987, the application for accession to the EU submitted by the Kingdom of Morocco was rejected on the same grounds. The procedure for a new state's accession to the EU includes the following steps:

- The candidate country submits its application to the Council.

- The Commission expresses its preliminary opinion, in which it recommends that member states either start negotiations, not start negotiations, or

wait until the candidate country fulfills certain conditions necessary for the start of negotiations. The Commission's opinion must be thoroughly justified.

- If the Commission's opinion is positive, accession negotiations begin. Their goal is to draft a treaty that is intended to define the conditions for the candidate state's admission to the EU and the changes that should be made to the founding treaties. At all stages of the negotiations, member states adhere to a common position, which is approved by the Council. Once the negotiations are completed and the draft treaty is agreed upon, it is submitted for signature by representatives of the member states and the candidate country.

- Next, the Commission is consulted, and it must give its opinion on the signed agreement. Since the Commission's representatives are closely involved in the negotiation process, this act is purely formal.

- Parliament must also express its opinion on the accession application. In principle, it has the right of veto. A positive decision is made by a majority vote of all members of the European Parliament.

- The next step is the approval of the treaty by the Council, which acts on the basis of the principle of unanimity. The Council's decision is a mere formality, as the position of the member states has already been recorded by the fact that their representatives have signed the accession agreement.

- In order for the treaty to enter into force, it must be ratified by the signatory states in accordance with the constitutional procedure. On the part of the EU member states, the rule of unanimity applies: if at least one of them fails to ratify the treaty, the accession of the candidate country (or candidate countries, if there are several) is blocked. This principle does not apply to the candidate countries: if an accession agreement is not ratified by one of the candidate countries, this does not prevent it from entering into force in the EU member states and other candidate countries. EU membership is perpetual. The Treaty does not contain any provision that would allow for the exclusion of a state that has joined the EU from its membership (EU membership can only be suspended). Thus, it is legally impossible. Voluntary withdrawal from the European Union is also not provided for in the founding treaties. However, according to EU lawyers, it is not impossible. If any state wishes to leave the European Union for one reason or another, there is no point in holding it by force.

Joining the European Union (EU) is a complex and multi-stage process that involves a series of negotiations and reforms. The procedure for joining the EU is outlined in the Treaty on European Union (TEU), and it generally follows these steps:

Application: A country interested in joining the EU must first submit an official application to the European Commission. This initiates the process.

Screening and Opinion: The European Commission and the EU member states assess the applicant country's readiness and ability to meet the membership criteria. The Commission provides an opinion on whether the country is prepared for accession.

Negotiation: If the Commission's opinion is positive and the EU member states agree, formal negotiations are opened with the applicant country. These negotiations cover various policy areas and require the country to align its laws and regulations with EU standards. The negotiations can take several years.

Accession Treaty: Once negotiations are completed, an accession treaty is drawn up, detailing the terms and conditions of the country's membership. This treaty requires unanimous approval from existing EU member states and the consent of the European Parliament.

Ratification: The accession treaty is ratified by the applicant country's national government, often through a referendum or a parliamentary vote. It may also require amendments to the country's constitution to bring it into alignment with EU standards.

Transition Period: After ratification, there may be a transition period during which the country prepares for full membership. During this time, the country may be subject to certain EU rules and regulations but does not have full voting rights within EU institutions.

Full Membership: The country formally becomes an EU member state on a specified date.

Throughout this process, there are several key criteria that an applicant country must meet to be considered for EU membership. These criteria are often referred to as the **"Copenhagen criteria"** and include:

Political Criteria: The applicant country must have stable institutions that guarantee democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities.

Economic Criteria: The country must have a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the EU.

***Acquis Communautaire*:** The country must adopt and implement the EU's body of laws, regulations, and standards (the acquis) in various policy areas.

Ability to Assume Obligations: The applicant country must be able to take on the obligations of EU membership, including financial contributions and the ability to participate in the common EU policies.

It's important to note that the process can be lengthy and challenging, and each country's experience is unique. The timeline and conditions for accession can vary, and not all applicants necessarily become EU member states. Accession is subject to the approval and consensus of existing EU member states, and each country's progress depends on its individual circumstances and the pace of its reforms.

7.2 Features of EU enlargement to the Eastern Europe

Self-reflection questions:

- *How did the EU's enlargement to Eastern Europe change the geopolitical landscape of Europe following the end of the Cold War?*

- *What were the main historical events and factors that led to the Eastern European countries seeking EU membership?*

The fourth enlargement of the EU, which resulted in the accession of Austria, Finland, and Sweden, was carried out in accordance with this procedure established by the Treaty on European Union. However, when it became clear that many other European states wanted to join the EU, the Treaty's provisions proved insufficient. In fact, the fifth enlargement of the EU is qualitatively different from all the previous ones.

Previously, no more than three new members joined the EU at a time. Now it is a question of more or less simultaneous accession of 12 (or 13) states, i.e., almost doubling the number of member states. This alone puts an exorbitant burden on the Community's institutional system, which is already working at the limit of its capabilities with 15 member states. First, the decision-making mechanism becomes

extremely complicated, and thus the time required for decision-making becomes even longer.

Such a slowdown contradicts the realities of the current stage of integration, which require, on the contrary, a comprehensive simplification and acceleration of the rulemaking process. Secondly, the heterogeneity of the Community is already so great that in order to implement certain types of policies, it was necessary to depart from the "community method" in its pure form and provide for the possibility of differentiation.

The need for differentiation in the EU of 28 states will be even greater. The question arises whether the Community will have to introduce permanent exemptions from the Treaty instead of temporary ones, which would contradict the very idea of integration and the principle of equality of member states.

Thirdly, the increase in the number of member states and the inevitable enlargement of the institutional structure jeopardize the interests of small countries, which value the principle of equality, and in particular the right to send a citizen to the Commission and to regularly preside over the Council.

However, at the same time, since most of the candidates are small countries, the interests of large member states are also threatened. After all, if the norm of representation remains unchanged, these states, where the vast majority of the EU's population lives, could find themselves at the mercy of possible coalitions of states representing a minority of EU citizens.

In previous enlargements, the EU's territory and population grew gradually. Now they were to increase by one third at once. This inevitably places an additional burden on Community services and EU infrastructure. In the past, the Community was joined by states with more or less the same level of socio-economic development and identical models of political and socio-economic structure. The fifth enlargement is another matter. It covers relatively backward countries that are in the process of systemic transformation.

The degree of backwardness of the region compared to Western Europe is illustrated by the following example. The total GDP of the candidate countries (approximately 400 billion euros) is equal to the GDP of the Netherlands. However, while the population of the Netherlands is 16 million people, more than 106 million people live in the candidate countries. The reason for the relative backwardness of

the candidate countries is the peculiarities of their history. The area of the future EU enlargement is characterized by a huge diversity of ethnicity, religious beliefs, traditions and lifestyles of different peoples.

However, there are several important common features in their historical destinies that allow them to be considered a special region of Europe, and not only in the context of joining the EU. First, due to geographical and social conditions, all of these countries were dominated by an extensive mode of economic activity. This had a number of fundamental consequences. The institution of private property did not take root in the countries of the region. The so-called "second serfdom," which was particularly brutal in Poland, Hungary, and Romania, had a huge negative impact on their development. It led to the weakness of the market economy, civil society, and political democracy, and the traditional insecurity of the individual. Secondly, none of the countries in the region has a tradition of strong, continuous and viable statehood.

Being located between major aggressive powers, the region has always been an arena of rivalry, and the peoples inhabiting it have always been subject to foreign domination. Control of the region was shared between the Ottoman and Habsburg empires, which were later joined by the Russian Empire and Prussia. Therefore, there is no culture of a single national interest, which plays such a significant role in the European Union system.

Thirdly, the region has always been an arena of confrontation between different religions - Catholicism, Orthodoxy, and Islam. The part of the Fifth Expansion area that was dominated by Orthodoxy and Islam was isolated from the major social shifts in Western Europe that marked milestones in the development of the capitalist mode of production.

Even in those parts of the region where Catholicism was established, the impact of these inherently secular processes was muted. In particular, Protestantism was not widespread in any of the candidate countries. This was both a consequence and a cause of socio-economic backwardness. At the same time, due to their geographical proximity to Western Europe, the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe learned from its experience much that remained inaccessible to the peoples of the Russian Empire.

This is the "historical capital" on which hopes for the successful integration of CEE countries into the European Union are based. For integration to "work" in the

candidate countries, formal adoption of the *acquis communautaire* is not enough. The question is how the norms developed by Western European countries will be implemented in a completely different social environment.

The political leaders of the member states and the European Community, of course, knew from the very beginning about the difficulties that the fifth enlargement would entail. They saw the scale of the costs that the current participants in the integration process would have to bear. The risks involved in achieving integration were not secret either. However, after a brief hesitation, they decided to take responsibility for the development of Central and Eastern Europe and to move forward boldly, no matter what the cost.

The main reason for this decision was that the European Union essentially had no other choice. It would have been counterproductive to maintain a closed integration grouping in post-communist Europe consisting of the most developed and wealthy European states. If this had happened, the instability and economic difficulties in the former socialist countries and the political consequences of refusing to join the EU would have created an extremely unfavorable geopolitical environment for the EU member states. Ultimately, this could jeopardize the fruits of integration. Therefore, in the current situation, the most rational course of action was to extend the area of integration to Central and Eastern Europe, despite all the difficulties associated with it.

7.3 The strategy for preparing for the fifth enlargement of the European Union

Self-reflection questions:

- *How has EU enlargement impacted regional disparities within Eastern European countries and the wider EU?*
- *How has EU enlargement contributed to the consolidation of democratic institutions and the rule of law in Eastern European countries?*

The European Union's enlargement to Eastern Europe is a significant and ongoing process that has expanded the EU to include several countries from the former Eastern Bloc. This process has been instrumental in shaping the modern EU and promoting stability, democracy, and economic development in the region. Below are some key milestones in the EU's enlargement to Eastern Europe:

1. **2004 Enlargement**: In 2004, the EU underwent its largest single enlargement to date, often referred to as the "Big Bang" enlargement. This saw ten countries from Central and Eastern Europe join the EU. These countries were the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia, as well as Cyprus and Malta. This enlargement was a historic step in the integration of Eastern European countries into the EU.

2. **2007 Enlargement**: In 2007, Bulgaria and Romania became EU member states, further expanding the EU's presence in Eastern Europe.

3. **2013 Enlargement**: Croatia became the EU's 28th member state in 2013. Although not located in the traditional Eastern European region, its accession continued the trend of EU expansion.

4. **Western Balkans**: Several countries in the Western Balkans, such as Montenegro, Serbia, North Macedonia, and Albania, have been candidates or potential candidates for EU membership. While these countries are not located in Eastern Europe per se, they are part of the broader EU enlargement process in southeastern Europe.

5. **Potential Future Enlargements**: The EU has expressed its commitment to the European perspective for countries in Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans. Countries like Ukraine and Moldova, among others, have expressed interest in EU membership, but the accession process involves meeting specific criteria and is subject to negotiation and approval by existing EU member states.

EU enlargement to Eastern Europe has contributed to regional stability, economic development, and the spread of democratic values. However, it has also posed challenges in terms of integration, harmonizing policies, and addressing economic disparities. The process reflects the EU's commitment to extending its reach and promoting peace, prosperity, and cooperation in the wider European region.

The political leaders of the European Union, being in a state of euphoria caused by the fall of socialist regimes and the end of the Cold War, clearly underestimated the problems of the fifth enlargement. As they thought, the main burden of preparations for enlargement was to be borne by the candidate countries.

As for the European Union itself, its task, as it was seen in the early 1990s, was to solve four problems.

First, it had to establish some "safety net" principles for the accession of CEE countries and formalize them in legislation.

Secondly, it was necessary to carry out a minimal institutional reform, in particular, to change the voting system in the Council, the presidency, the composition of the Commission, and the norms of representation in the Parliament.

Third, financial resources had to be found to provide assistance to the candidate countries. And finally, fourthly, it was necessary to change some areas of EU policy, first of all, the common agricultural policy and the policy of economic and social cohesion. The decision in principle on the possibility of a fifth enlargement was made at a meeting of the European Council in Copenhagen in June 1993.

At the same time, it outlined ways to fulfill the first task facing the EU in connection with this prospect - determining the conditions and principles of accession of new member states. The decision adopted in Copenhagen stated that the accession of Central and Eastern European countries to the EU would be possible only if they met three political and economic criteria. The first is the existence of stable institutions that guarantee democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and the respect and protection of minority rights. The second is the existence of a viable market economy, as well as the ability to withstand the pressures of competition and market forces within the Union. The third is the ability to assume the responsibilities associated with EU accession, including supporting the goals of political, economic and monetary union.

The Copenhagen decision also included a fourth criterion, which rarely appears in political and academic discussions of EU enlargement. This is the ability of the Union itself to absorb new member states without jeopardizing its own integrity and stability. This criterion excludes the membership of a large European country such as Russia, whose accession would undermine the internal balance of the integration grouping consisting of small and medium-sized states. The Copenhagen criteria were then enshrined in the founding treaties.

The first step in this direction was taken in the preparation of the Amsterdam Treaty. In particular, Article 6(1) of the Treaties on European Union now reads: "The Union shall be founded on the principles of freedom, democracy, respect for human

rights and fundamental freedoms... principles common to all Member States." In order to reinforce this provision in practice, a procedure was established for the termination of EU membership in respect of a state found to have seriously and repeatedly violated the principles on which the European Union is founded (Article 7 of the Treaties on European Union and Article 309 of the Treaties establishing the European Communities).

The existence of a violation should be recorded by the EU Council at the level of heads of state and government on the basis of the principle of unanimity. The opinion of the Parliament is then requested, which must give its consent by a two-thirds majority of the votes cast, the number of those voting must be a majority of the members of the Parliament.

In the course of the consideration of the matter, the government of the offending state may submit any considerations in this regard. Further, the Council, acting on the basis of the principle of qualified majority (the vote of the violating state is excluded), may suspend certain rights of this state arising from the Treaty. It may, for example, exclude representatives of that state from voting in the Council or stop providing that state with allocations from the Community budget (in particular, payments from the structural funds).

At the same time, the obligations of the violating state under the Treaty remain in force. The Treaty of Nice provides for the possibility of taking preventive measures against a Member State that violates the principles of the Union.

At the request of one-third of the Member States, the Parliament or the Commission, the Council may (by a four-fifths majority and with the consent of the Parliament) declare that there is a clear threat of a breach of the principles of the Union by a Member State. The Council must hear the state in question before making a ruling on the matter. It may also request independent experts to submit a report on the matter. The Council should regularly review whether the motives that led it to adopt the measures in question remain valid. It is quite obvious that all these provisions are addressed not so much to current member states as to candidate countries.

Initially, it was assumed that the second task (institutional reform) would be fulfilled during the preparation of the Amsterdam Treaty. However, due to sharp disagreements between the member states, this was not possible. The main changes

in the institutional structure necessary for the practical implementation of the fifth enlargement were agreed upon only in the Treaty of Nice.

The most difficult task was to resolve the third one: financing the fifth enlargement. On July 15, 1997, the Commission presented a report entitled "Agenda 2000", which was approved by the European Council at its meeting in Berlin in March 1999. This lengthy (approximately 2000 pages) document outlined the Commission's view of the future development of the European Union and put forward proposals for financing the EU's needs in 2000-2006. One of the main places in the Commission's report was devoted to the problem of enlargement.

As a result of fierce debate, it was decided not to increase the rate of contributions to the EU budget and to leave it at 1.27% of GDP. This means that 80 billion euros will be allocated for assistance to the candidate countries in 2000-2006, with individual candidate countries receiving 4% of their GDP.

As a result of the enlargement, the average GDP per capita, which is used to calculate payments from the Community funds, will decline sharply. If the size of the Community budget remains unchanged, the least developed of the current member states will lose the right to financial assistance, which is one of the main motivations for their participation in the integration grouping. Spain will be particularly hard hit, as it has 7% of the EU's population and receives 30% of payments from the Community's funds.

At Madrid's insistence, budgeting issues are left to the unanimity principle. The main instruments for providing financial and technical assistance to candidate countries are the following programs:

1)   **PHARE**. This program was established in December 1989 and was originally intended to provide emergency assistance to Poland and Hungary (hence the name - Poland-Hungary: Assistance for the Reconstruction of the Economy). According to Agenda 2000, 1.56 billion euros are allocated annually for its financing. The main areas of the program are: assisting the governments of the candidate countries in implementing the acquis communautaire and mobilizing public and private investment to ensure that the candidate countries meet EU standards in such areas as transport, environmental protection, labor conditions, quality of industrial goods, etc.

-    **ISPA.** The name of the program stands for "Instrument for Structural Adjustment Policy in the Process of Accession". The program is worth 1.04 billion euros annually. The main task is to finance the modernization of the public infrastructure of the candidate countries.

-    **SAPARD.** A program designed exclusively to assist in the development of agriculture and rural development. EUR 520 billion is allocated annually for these purposes. The funds allocated under these three programs (3.12 billion euros) are distributed according to the population criterion. Therefore, Poland receives 30%, Romania - 28%, Bulgaria - 10%, Hungary - 7%, Lithuania - 6%, Czech Republic - 5%, Latvia and Slovakia - 4%, Estonia - 2% and Slovenia - 1%. In addition, the resources of the European Investment Bank are also used (in 1997-2000, 7 billion euros).

The European Investment Bank closely cooperates with the World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which also attract funds for projects in CEE countries. A form of indirect financial support for candidate countries is their participation in a number of EU programs (research, health, environmental protection, energy, vocational training, education, support for small and medium- sized businesses, etc.)

According to the unanimous opinion of experts, the amounts allocated are absolutely insufficient to maintain the level of assistance provided to Greece, Ireland, Spain, and Portugal. They clearly do not ensure equalization of the levels of socio-economic development. The situation is exacerbated by the fact that only two of the ten CEE countries (Poland and Hungary) have restored the level of industrial production they had in 1989.

According to estimates published by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, it will take at least 10-15 years for the Czech Republic to catch up with the least developed of the current member states, 20-25 years for Hungary, Poland and Slovenia, 35 years for Romania and Lithuania, and 65-75 years for Albania.

15 countries have applied to join the EU in different years (dates of application are given in parentheses). The applications of Norway (1961, 1967, 1982) and Switzerland (1992) are frozen and are not considered due to the negative outcome of referendums in both countries. Twelve countries were officially recognized as candidate countries in the mid-1990s. These are Cyprus (1990), Malta (1990, 1998), Hungary and Poland (1994), Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and

Estonia (1995), the Czech Republic and Slovenia (1996). The position of Turkey, which applied for membership in 1982, is still uncertain.

The Community's position on the composition of the candidate countries was quite controversial. Several times it experienced sharp fluctuations that led to negative political consequences. In December 1997, based on the Commission's estimates, the European Council decided to start formal accession negotiations in spring 1998 with six countries considered to be the most "advanced" in their preparations for EU membership: Cyprus, Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovenia, and Estonia. In order to "sweeten the pot" for those left out of the official negotiations, it was decided to establish an annual European conference, which would represent the EU and all candidate countries, regardless of their degree of readiness. The first conference of this kind was convened in London in 1998.

As expected, this decision was met with a negative reaction from those to whom it was addressed. Turkey's reaction was particularly strong, as it refused to participate in the London conference.

Therefore, at a **meeting of the European Council in Helsinki in December 1999**, it was decided not to distinguish between the candidate countries and to negotiate with all of them simultaneously. Negotiations with six other candidate countries - Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, and Slovakia - began in February 2000.

Turkey has been officially recognized as a candidate country that can join the EU based on the same criteria as other candidate countries. However, it "dropped out" of the calculation of votes in the Council after the fifth enlargement, as set out in the Nice Treaty, and the circle of candidate countries with which official negotiations are underway.

This leads to one conclusion: despite all the assurances about Turkey's "European vocation," its undeniable success in mastering the *acquis communautaire* (this process has been going on for more than 30 years), and its entry into the EU customs union, Turkey's accession to the EU is being postponed. The official explanation is that Turkey does not yet meet European human rights standards.

Thus, the program of preparation of candidate countries for EU accession includes the following elements:

- Development of an "accession strategy" (adopted at the European Council meeting in Essen in December 1994). The essence of the strategy is to gradually expand and deepen bilateral European agreements with CEE countries.

- Preparing candidate countries for the start of formal negotiations. Its main element is familiarization of the representatives of these countries with the *acquis communautaire*, divided into 31 chapters (80 thousand pages), which is carried out by the European Commission staff. Identification of those provisions, the adoption of which by the candidate countries is a purely technical matter, and significant problems that should be subject to negotiations.

- Creation of so-called "accession partnerships" in parallel with the mechanisms of the European agreements. Their material basis is the funds of financial instruments of accession, and their main task is to identify and eliminate bottlenecks that serve as an obstacle to the integration of candidate countries into the EU's Single Internal Market. An integral part of the preparation of the candidate countries for accession was the Commission's constant monitoring of the progress in individual countries.

The Commission's conclusions were published annually. Malta, Cyprus, and Estonia made the most progress. They were followed by the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovenia. Poland, the largest of the candidate countries, was in an exceptional position, as its weight in the enlarged Union would have been the same as that of Spain. For a long time, the probable dates of accession of the candidate countries were repeatedly postponed. This issue was finally clarified at a meeting of **the European Council in Brussels on October 24-25, 2002**.

The EU's political leaders agreed with the Commission's conclusion that Hungary, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, and the Czech Republic already met all the political criteria for accession, and that they would meet the economic criteria by 2004. The summit participants declared their determination to conclude negotiations with these 10 countries before the European Council meeting in Copenhagen on December 12-13, 2002, and to sign the Accession Treaty in Athens in April 2003.

The final document of the summit calls on the leaders of the Greek and Turkish communities of Cyprus to reach a comprehensive agreement on the reunification of

the country before the signing of the Accession Treaty. The political leaders of the Union appealed to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan to make every effort to achieve this goal. The principles of the future agreement will be fully taken into account in the Treaty of Accession. If this is not achieved, the accession of Cyprus will be based on the decisions of the European Council adopted at its meeting in Helsinki in 1999. The summit noted that Bulgaria and Romania would be able to join the EU no earlier than 2007.

As for Turkey, the European Union faced an extremely difficult dilemma. On the one hand, Turkey's accession to the EU is hindered not just by individual cases of human rights violations, as official propaganda claims. According to many scholars and politicians, the real reason is the incompatibility of some fundamental civilizational features of Muslim Turkey and Christian Western Europe. Turkey's accession would dramatically change the geopolitical position of the European Union. In this case, the EU would come into direct contact with the zone of instability in the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia, with all the risks that this entails in the spheres of its external and internal security.

When making the final decision on the timing of the fifth enlargement, the European Council provided for a number of "reassurance" measures. First, even after signing the Treaty, the Commission will continue its monitoring and will submit a final report on the progress of the implementation of the *acquis communautaire* by the candidate countries six months before the expected date of their accession. Second, the Accession Agreement will include two specific provisions, in addition to standard safeguard clauses. Within three years of accession, any Member State or the Commission will have the right to raise the issue of additional safeguard measures in case of failure of a newly acceding state to fulfill its obligations in the single internal market or in justice and home affairs cooperation. The Brussels summit also made a final decision on another controversial issue - the financing of the fifth enlargement.

EU leaders confirmed that, despite the requests of the candidate countries, the EU budget for 2000-2006 will not be increased. Financial support will be provided in the form of direct payments on a progressive scale. The ultimate goal is to bring the financial support to the new EU members to the level of support currently provided to less developed member states by 2013.

The realization of this goal depends on the outcome of the reform of the Common Agricultural Policy and the formation of the EU's financial perspective for 2007-2013. Thus, the evolution of the Western European Community's policy towards the CEE states, up to the beginning of negotiations with the "first wave" countries on their accession to the EU, is the basis for concluding that an adequate response to the threat faced by the European Union and the whole of Europe at the turn of history was successfully developed. However, it should be noted that the process of eastern enlargement was a more complex and lengthy project than expected in the 1980s.

Problems related to the scale of the project, the low level of economic development of the candidate countries and the need to reform the EU's institutional structure led to inconsistency in the EU's strategy for relations with CEE. Despite all the negative aspects and uncertainties on the way to accession, the candidate countries became full members of the Union.

7.4 The fifth enlargement of the EU and its consequences

Self-reflection questions:

- *How has EU enlargement impacted regional disparities within Eastern European countries and the wider EU?*
- *How has EU enlargement contributed to the consolidation of democratic institutions and the rule of law in Eastern European countries?*

The issue of the CEE countries' accession to the EU has become a geopolitical reality, and it can now be stated that the CEE countries have achieved their goal. In 2007, the second phase of EU enlargement ended, and the EU included 27 European countries. The enlargement of the EU has directly affected the nature of relations with the countries that are directly on its eastern borders, and thus with Ukraine. Important changes in approaches to Ukraine's relations with the EU were outlined after the Luxembourg EU Summit in April 2002, which, together with the final date of eastward enlargement, outlined the main provisions of the concept of relations with the EU's new neighbors, in particular, on its eastern borders (Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus).

The change in the nature of the EU's relations with our country is also evidenced by the results of the **third annual EU-Ukraine conference "Wider Europe:**

Ukraine's Perspective" held in **Brussels in March 2003**. The document discussed at the conference by the European Commission was a kind of compromise between Ukraine's desire to have clearer integration prospects and the EU's desire not to be bound by such obligations. The concept of **"Wider Europe - Neighborhood: New Frontiers of Relations with New Eastern and Southern Neighbors"** focuses on the issue of economic cooperation, which is of primary importance for Ukraine, as this area is almost secondary to political cooperation in the EU-Ukraine Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), which has been in force since 1998.

The dominance of political issues in the PCA was determined by the degree and order of the EU's real interest in cooperation with Ukraine at that time. Under the new strategy, Ukraine was offered "neighborhood status," which, although it does not provide real prospects for EU membership, certainly opens up broader opportunities for mutual cooperation. It should be noted that the possibility of Ukraine joining the EU is not a reality now, as the EU is going through a new adaptation period related to its latest enlargement. In addition, it should be borne in mind that the Balkan countries are next in line to join the EU.

An important factor in the development of the EU-Ukraine dialogue is also Ukraine-Russia relations, which remain strategic due to direct dependence on Russian energy resources. However, despite all these facts, it must be recognized that Ukraine's ability to integrate into Europe depends, first and foremost, on its ability to put things in order in the country. Ukraine must achieve significant results in its transformation processes to prove its commitment to the values of the European community, to the cause of integration, acceptance of its conditions and ability to fulfill them unconditionally.

Thus, the direct neighborhood with the EU puts on the agenda the need to revise and improve the level of the current legal framework of EU-Ukraine relations, which currently exists on the basis of the PCA, opens up prospects for increasing Ukraine's role in shaping the system of regional stability and strengthening the security regime of the common borders with Ukraine, and contributes to the growth of Ukraine's geopolitical role in the EU's common foreign and security policy. After the enlargement, the EU became the most important market for Ukrainian exports, which, with Ukraine's accession to the WTO, gained additional opportunities to increase and expand the range of Ukrainian exports.

With the EU's borders approaching, Ukraine can count on additional targeted technical assistance in areas such as environmental protection, transportation, and energy, which will facilitate the gradual integration of Ukrainian energy, transportation, and telecommunications networks into European infrastructures. In general, achieving sustainable economic development, political stability and democratization of Ukrainian society should become the objective factors that will guarantee the gradual evolution of Ukraine's partnership with the EU into equal relations between partners with the EU in the future.

8. European Union and Ukraine

8.1 History of Ukraine-EU Relations

8.2 The EU's Eastern Partnership and Ukraine

8.3 The Association Agreement between the EU and Ukraine

8.4 Prospects and challenges of defense cooperation between the EU and Ukraine

8.1 History of Ukraine-EU Relations

Self-reflection questions:

- *What key events or milestones have shaped the history of Ukraine-EU relations?*
- *What challenges have Ukraine and the EU faced in building and sustaining their relationship over the years?*
- *What lessons can be drawn from the history of Ukraine-EU relations, both for Ukraine and the European Union?*

Ukraine's intention to develop relations with the European Union was first proclaimed in the Resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine of July 2, 1993 "On the Main Directions of Ukraine's Foreign Policy".

The relations between Ukraine and the European Union were launched in December 1991, when the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, as a representative of the EU presidency, officially recognized Ukraine's independence in a letter on behalf of the European Union.

Subsequently, Ukraine's strategic course toward European integration was confirmed and developed in the Strategy for Ukraine's Integration into the EU, approved on June 11, 1998, and the Program for Ukraine's Integration into the EU, approved on September 14, 2000. It proclaimed a long-term strategic goal - Ukraine's European integration. According to Article 11 of the Law of Ukraine "On the Principles of Domestic and Foreign Policy," one of the fundamental principles of Ukraine's foreign policy is to ensure Ukraine's integration into the European political, economic, and legal space with a view to gaining EU membership.

On March 5, 2007, Ukraine and the EU started negotiations on a new agreement between Ukraine and the EU. On September 9, 2008, at the Paris Summit, Ukraine and the EU reached a political agreement to conclude a future agreement in the format of an Association Agreement based on the principles of political association and economic integration. In accordance with the agreements

reached during the Paris EU-Ukraine Summit, in 2009 the parties developed and approved the Association Agenda, which replaced the EU-Ukraine Action Plan and aimed to serve as a guide for reforms in Ukraine in the process of preparing the implementation of the future Association Agreement.

At the 15th EU-Ukraine Summit in Kyiv on December 19, 2011, negotiations on the future Association Agreement were completed, and on March 30, 2012, the text of the future Agreement was initialed by the heads of the EU and Ukraine negotiating teams. The political part of the Association Agreement was signed on March 21, 2014, and the economic part - on June 27, 2014.

On September 16, 2014, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and the European Parliament simultaneously ratified the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement. On November 1, 2014, it was provisionally applied. The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement entered into full force on September 1, 2017. This is an international legal document that enshrines at the contractual level the transition of relations between Ukraine and the EU from partnership and cooperation to political association and economic integration.

8.2 The EU's Eastern Partnership and Ukraine

Self-reflection questions:
- *How have political and economic considerations influenced the EU's approach to the Eastern Partnership with Ukraine?*
- *How does the Eastern Partnership foster regional cooperation among participating countries, and what benefits does this cooperation bring to Ukraine?*
- *What criteria or indicators would I use to evaluate the success of the Eastern Partnership in the context of Ukraine?*

The European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), launched in 2004 by the European Union in connection with its unprecedented enlargement to establish a new level of relations with the EU's new neighbors and avoid the formation of dividing lines in Europe, also included the southern dimension of the EU's foreign policy.

Thus, both Ukraine and, say, Algeria found themselves united by the EU's essentially similar approach to building further relations. Given that this situation was not entirely satisfactory for Ukraine, given its aspirations to join the EU (and the ENP does not provide for membership, nor does it allow for any initiatives on the

part of the recipient countries), Ukraine has repeatedly appealed to the EU with a proposal to introduce a differentiated approach to different ENP member states, taking into account the specifics of their aspirations and joint steps already taken in bilateral relations. in bilateral relations. So it is not surprising that when Poland and Sweden took the initiative to launch took the initiative to launch **the Eastern Partnership (EaP)**, an offshoot of the ENP.

Partnership (EaP) for the six former Soviet republics, each of which sees its future as a member of the European Union, Ukraine welcomed this event with joy and enthusiasm, hoping to sign an Association Agreement with the EU in the near future. The Eastern Partnership emerged as a response to the challenges faced by the European Union. faced by the European Union.

For example, since 2006 there have been interruptions in energy supplies to the EU since 2006 due to conflicts between Russia and Ukraine, and Belarus has been experiencing oppression of the opposition after the re-election of President The unresolved conflicts in Transnistria and Nagorno-Karabakh continue to be a source of instability in the region, and the unresolved issues of South Ossetia and Abkhazia are leading to open military conflict in Georgia.

The EU concludes that the prospect of EU membership, even if it is remote even if remote, will contribute to political stabilization, economic and democratic development of the states of Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus, and therefore it is necessary to distinguish them from other ENP participants and focus on a differentiated approach in relations with them.

To implement the new policy, the EU uses the **European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI)** as a new financial instrument for the implementation of the ENP, designed to support internal development priorities and increase the responsibility of neighboring countries.

Launched in 2007, the ENPI has become the main financial assistance under the European Union's Eastern Partnership: Bilateral Relations and Multilateral Dimension of the Partnership, and the total EU assistance to the neighboring countries for the period 2007-2013 exceeds €12 billion, which is a 35% increase in assistance to the region compared to the previous seven years.

Unlike previous financial instruments, the ENPI allows recipient countries to join such EU assistance instruments as Twinning, TAIEX and SIGMA, which were

previously available only to EU candidate countries. In addition, direct budgetary support is offered, which the EU allocates directly to governments, and special technical grants (Governance Facility) for countries that demonstrate success in in reforming the governance system.

However, according to Ukrainian researchers of this issue, the government and the non-governmental sector cannot fully understand the processes taking place within ENPI, and therefore cannot effectively use the potential of this instrument. The main principle of cooperation is the slogan "more for more" is becoming the main principle of cooperation, which means that the more the more progress a partner state shows, the more support it will receive from the European Union, both financial and political.

This should encourage recipient states to move toward EU norms and standards. This principle is also enshrined in the 2013 Eastern Partnership Roadmap. As already mentioned, the European Union implements its policy within the EaP in two dimensions: bilateral and multilateral, which are significantly different, which was emphasized by the Joint Declaration proclaimed at the Warsaw Summit of the Eastern Partnership in September 2011.

8.3 The Association Agreement between the EU and Ukraine

Self-reflection questions:
- *What do I know about the main objectives and goals of the Association Agreement between the EU and Ukraine?*
- *What role does the Association Agreement play in the broader geopolitical context, considering Ukraine's relationship with russia and other neighboring countries?*
- *What will be the long-term impact of the Association Agreement on Ukraine and its relationship with the EU?*

The signing of the Association Agreement (political part) between Ukraine and the European Union (hereinafter referred to as the AA or the Agreement) is undoubtedly an important event for both domestic political development and relations with the EU.

The speed of the signing emphasizes the EU's significant support for Ukraine and its solidarity with our country. At the same time, the scope and significance of

the agreement should be realistically assessed, and further steps should be clearly defined, especially in the process of implementing the Agreement.

For reference: On March 21, at the regular meeting of the European Council (EU Summit), the following political provisions of the Association Agreement were determined as signed by the final act: Preamble, Article 1 and Sections I, II, VII. At the same time, the Agreement (Preamble) does not contain a membership perspective for Ukraine, but only refers to the EU's recognition of "Ukraine's European aspirations" and welcomes its European choice. The final act on signing other sections of the agreement states the following: "The signatories confirm their obligation to sign and conclude Chapters III, IV, V and VI of the Agreement, which together with the other chapters constitute a single document".

The decision to divide the Agreement itself caused a wave of discussions and questions. Throughout the negotiation process and even after the final initialing of the AA (19.07.2012), the EU categorically rejected this possibility. The EU justified such urgency by the length of time it took for all EU member states to ratify the Agreement: the process of ratification of the EU-Ukraine Partnership and Cooperation Agreement lasted from 1994 to 1998 (the EU had 15 member states at that time). According to unofficial information from Ukrainian and European diplomats, the decision to split the Agreement was not prepared in advance and was announced by some EU member states directly during the emergency EU summit on Ukraine on March 6.

The decision was justified by fears of provoking Russia and the economic interests of some EU member states in relations with the Russian Federation. The signing of the political part does not pose any potential threats to relations with Russia. With the signing of the political part, Ukraine and the EU member states can begin the ratification process. As for the part of the Agreement on the establishment of a deep and comprehensive free trade area, the European Council's conclusions on Ukraine (21/03/2014) state that "the European Union and its member states are committed to signing the remainder of the Association Agreement and the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement, which together with the political provisions constitute a single mechanism".

Unlike the political part, which will enter into force only after ratification, the decision to temporarily apply most of the economic provisions of the Agreement before its entry into force was agreed upon at the end of September 2013. At the same time, the Committee of Permanent Representatives of the EU Member States

agreed on the scope of the provisional application of the Agreement. the scope of the Agreement's provisional application.

At the same time, the European Council undertook to compensate for the refusal to sign the economic provisions pledged to compensate for its refusal to sign the economic provisions by a decision to temporarily eliminate customs duties - the so-called autonomous trade measures - on most of Ukraine's exports to the EU. The decision is to be adopted in the near future and will be effective from July to November 1, 2014.

On the eve of the signing of the Agreement, the political discourse in Ukraine was overloaded with speculation, primarily around the timing of the signing of the Agreement and its division into two parts. The refusal of the previous government to sign the AA during the Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius on November 28-29, 2013 was the main reason for the social explosion in the country. Therefore, such speculations do not contribute to the normalization of the situation and have rather a destructive impact, as more important and urgent tasks are lost from sight. First of all, we are talking about the preparation and implementation of the Agreement.

In fact, preparations for the implementation of the Association Agreement in Ukraine have been going on for several years. In 2009, the Association Agenda (AA) was approved and entered into force. It was supposed to become a practical tool for preparing for the implementation of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement before it enters into force. Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU before it enters into force. for reference.

Annual departmental plans for the implementation of the AA were approved. According to the Ukrainian government (as of 20.08.13; no more up-to-date information is available on the government portal), only some progress has been made on most of the priorities of the AA ("Political Dialogue", "Trade and Trade-related Issues", "Other Areas of Cooperation"). At the same time, the "significant progress" noted by the previous government in some other subchapters, taking into account European assessments, can be questioned (we are talking primarily about such subchapters as "Fight against corruption", "Cooperation on justice, freedom and security", "Economic cooperation", "Cooperation in the field of energy, including nuclear issues").

However, according to monitoring conducted mainly by non-governmental organizations, the state of implementation of these plans remained unsatisfactory.

According to the results of public monitoring of Ukraine's implementation of the EU-Ukraine Association Agenda (May 2010-September 2012), conducted with the support of the International Renaissance Foundation, the state of "As of the end of 2011, most of the priorities of the AA (70 out of 78) were still under implementation, and significant progress was achieved only on about 20 priorities.

As of the end of June 2012, according to the analysis of the economic block of the Association Agreement, only 3 out of 48 areas of activity could be considered completed, according to experts; 42 priorities remained in the process of implementation, and the remaining 3 were assessed by experts as not fulfilled. According to the results of the last Public Monitoring of the fulfillment of the Association Agreement (October 1, 2013), the experts noted some progress made by the Ukrainian authorities in most of the 11 criteria formulated by the EU Council, which were required for the signing of the AA during the Vilnius Summit.

But even then, according to experts believe, this was evidence of the lack of guarantees for signing the Agreement. Given the suspension of the signing of the Association Agreement by the previous government of Ukraine, there is reason to believe that there was also suspension of the process of preparing the Agreement for implementation. This is evidenced by the following:

1) the implementation of the EU-Ukraine Association Agenda was not ensured in a timely manner and in full;

2) the national mechanism for implementing the AA at the state level has not yet been defined and presented;

3) the National Program for the Implementation of the Agreement, which should include a detailed list of measures for the step-by-step implementation of the Agreement's provisions and deadlines for their implementation, has not been approved.

As for the definition of the national implementation mechanism, it should be noted that there are currently no state decisions of the new government on this issue. The format of the government and its decisions, in particular on the distribution of competencies of the First Vice Prime Minister of Ukraine and Vice Prime Ministers of Ukraine, do not take into account the sphere of European integration at all. According to the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine, the work on the program of implementation program was suspended and has not yet been resumed.

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The actual draft of the on the eve of the Vilnius Summit was very crude, and was returned several times by the Ministry of Justice to other relevant ministries for revision. In developing the program, there was a tendency to avoid unnecessary burden on the line ministries and, accordingly, to minimize their participation in the necessary reforms. In light of the signing of the Association Agreement, the above issues require immediate attention from the Ukrainian authorities.

An analysis of most of the problematic issues in the field of European integration and a list of necessary recommendations was prepared in 2012 as part of the project "National Convention of Ukraine on the EU".

8.4 Prospects and challenges of defense cooperation between the EU and Ukraine

Self-reflection questions:
- *What role can such cooperation play in promoting stability in the broader European context?*
- *How can defense cooperation contribute to the modernization of Ukraine's military forces?*
- *In my opinion, what role should the EU play in fostering regional security in Eastern Europe, and how does defense cooperation with Ukraine fit into this role?*

Understanding the limitations and peculiarities of the EU in matters of security and defense cooperation, official Kyiv is trying to use all available mechanisms and tools to intensify military cooperation with Brussels and ensure victory on the battlefield. As the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine D. Kuleba noted in his online speech before the Council of the EU, in cooperation with the EU, Ukraine is interested in obtaining more weapons and ammunition, expanding the European Peace Fund to finance the purchase of weapons, as well as the rapid deployment of ammunition production lines, including together with Ukrainian enterprises.

Ukraine seeks to maximally expand military-technical cooperation with European partners, which is important for ensuring superiority over the Russian aggressor on the battlefield. According to the information of the European side, as of November 2022, the EU as a whole and its member states have provided Ukraine with 8 billion euros in military aid.

Among the existing mechanisms and instruments of cooperation between Ukraine and the EU in the defense sphere, the European Peace Fund has proven itself to be the most effective.

Unfortunately, the decision to introduce the EU training mission took a long time due to bureaucratic obstacles and delays on the part of individual EU member states. During this time, individual member states prepared their own training centers on their territory to train Ukrainian specialists in the use and maintenance of military equipment and weapons provided to Ukraine. Here it is important to note that the initial request regarding the deployment of the relevant military training mission was sent by official Kyiv to Brussels in the summer of 2021. And only in February 2022, shortly before the full-scale aggression of Russia, the Council of the EU reached preliminary agreements on the launch of the mission, and in wartime, the final decision at the EU level took another half a year.

Unfortunately, Ukraine cannot boast of active participation in PESCO projects, despite its active desire to be an active participant in a number of defense projects. Still in 2020, when the European Union opened the opportunity for third countries to join projects, official Kyiv declared its interest in participating in 20 joint projects. Unfortunately, the EU's demands for the participation of third countries turned out to be insurmountable for Ukraine, although they were politically motivated. Therefore, as of 2022, Ukraine is not a participant in the specified program. At the same time, Ukraine received support from individual project initiatives. For example, in February, a few days before the start of full-scale aggression, Ukraine turned to EU leaders for help in combating cyberattacks on Ukrainian military infrastructure facilities. In response, European institutions activated the EU Cyber Rapid Response Team and directed European experts to help the Ukrainian side.

In addition to cyber security, PESCO projects also cover the field of military-medical cooperation. From May 2022, the project of the European Medical Command, which is coordinated by Germany, is a platform for coordinating the efforts of civil and military services of the EU and NATO in organizing the evacuation of the wounded and seriously ill from the territory of Ukraine.

But in addition to certain political and bureaucratic obstacles, which do not allow obtaining a sufficient number of weapons in accordance with the requests of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, attempts to strengthen military cooperation are also facing significant resistance from russia, which is trying to discretize Ukraine in the eyes of Western partners. Russian propaganda to disrupt Ukraine's military cooperation with the EU and the USA is trying to discredit Kyiv as an unscrupulous partner in the use of Western weapons for the defense of our state. Many

information spills with the help of prominent media channels try to create the impression of chaos, embezzlement and smuggling of aid. Against this background, there are calls from some Western politicians and government officials to strengthen control over the transparency of the use of military aid received by Ukraine.

In response, Ukraine demonstrates its openness to cooperation with the relevant control bodies of partner states, as well as steps towards adaptation in Ukraine. In October 2022 for representatives of the donor states presented the results of the implementation of the NATO logistic program for accounting and control of weapons LOGFAS, its integration with national programs. But informational work should continue at the level of explaining to the societies of Western countries, which may be the targets of these disinformation campaigns by the Kremlin.

At the time of Russia's full-scale aggression against Ukraine, EU members were unprepared for the scale and intensity of conventional and hybrid threats emanating from russia.

Despite a significant number of cooperation initiatives in the field of defense, as well as existing strategic documents and plans for strengthening defense capabilities adopted after the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian war in 2014, in most cases the situation has not undergone a drastic improvement at the level of common European approaches to security and defense issues.

Adopted in March 2022, the Strategic Compass document, as a road map of the EU in the field of security and defense, is already outdated and inadequate to the current security realities in the world. The document was developed since 2020 and was finalized in the fall of 2021. Therefore, despite the hope for the active implementation of this document, in particular the partial activation already in 2023 of the EU Rapid Deployment Capabilities, it can be said that the Strategic Compass is not very effective from the point of view of forming the strategic autonomy of the EU, including in security and defense matters.

Currently, it is felt that in matters of strengthening defense capabilities, Brussels' hopes can only be based on new mechanisms to encourage EU members to joint defense purchases and develop the potential of the European defense complex (EDIRPA, EDIP). However, it is still worrying that the solutions proposed in the summer of 2022 have not yet taken on their final form. Such protracted bureaucratic processes against the background of an international armed conflict of

high intensity near the borders of the EU do not promote trust in EU initiatives on the part of the member states themselves.

Therefore, for the EU, at least in the medium term, transatlantic solidarity and cooperation with NATO is the main guarantee of security and strengthening of defense capabilities.

In general, the mechanisms for strengthening defense and military-technical cooperation launched in the European Union can bring positive results for the development of arms exports in the medium term. After all, military aid to Ukraine gave a significant impetus to the development and increase in the production of military products in EU countries. On the one hand, this is an understandable reaction of defense enterprises to the decrease in the stockpiles of weapons and military equipment, which are transferred to Ukraine by partner states. However, the rising pace of arms production creates opportunities for European public and private companies to develop the markets of third countries. For example, the Russian- Ukrainian war provided the largest increase in arms exports since 1989 for the enterprises of the military-industrial complex.

After all, as of October 2022, Ukraine received arms and ammunition worth 2.1 billion euros from the Czech Republic, 95% of which were commercial defense supplies. At the same time, we are talking about the production of military equipment and ammunition of both calibers of Soviet weapons and NATO standards. With Ukraine's victory in the war and the reduction of Russia's presence in foreign arms markets, gunsmiths from Central Europe can occupy a significant niche in the markets of traditional buyers of Soviet- style weapons.

CONTENT OF SEMINARS (PRACTICAL CLASSES):

1. THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF IDEAS AND CONCEPTS OF A UNITED EUROPE

1. Origin and development of ideas and concepts of a united Europe. The work of Richard Nicolaus Cudenhove-Kalergi "Pan-Europe: The Project": main provisions.

2. Development of the Pan-European movement after the Second World War.

3. Definition of European integration in terms of different European integration theories.

4. Federalism and functionalism as theoretical concepts of European integration: a comparative analysis.

2. STAGES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND THEIR CHARACTERISTICS. FOUNDATION AND INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

1. The beginning of European integration: the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community.

2. The Treaties of Rome. Formation of the European Economic Community and Euratom.

3. The search for an alternative to European communities: EFTA.

4. Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties: the evolution of the provisions on the EU's common foreign and security policy.

5. Institutions and mechanisms of foreign policy decision-making in the EU. Innovations provided by the Treaty of Nice.

6. The draft EU Constitution and the Lisbon Treaty.

3. Stages of European integration and their characteristics. Foundation and institutional structure of the European Union

1. History of European political cooperation. Reasons for the failed attempt to create the European Defense Community in 1952.

2. Activities of the Western European Union.

3. The Maastricht Treaty and the creation of a three-pillar structure. The essence of the CFSP

4. Formation and development of the EU Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP)

1. The Amsterdam Treaty, the establishment of the CSDP.
2. Formation of the crisis management function in the CSDP.
3. EU military and police missions and operations. Cooperation with NATO.

5. Formation and development of the EU Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP)

1. Declaration of Saint-Malo in 1998, "New Dynamics" of T. Blair's government.

2. Decision of the 1999 Hague EU Summit on the creation of the European Rapid Reaction Force.

3. Peculiarities of the EU-NATO political dialogue on the development of the European security system. The Berlin+ agreements.

4. EU crisis management missions and operations.

6. Formation and development of the EU Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP)

1. EU enlargement in 2004 and the establishment of the European Neighborhood Policy.

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2. Financial instruments of the ENP. The second phase of enlargement in 2007 and the adoption of the Black Sea Synergy.

3. The EU-Ukraine "Action Plan".

4. EU Eastern Partnership: bilateral and multilateral dimensions of cooperation. Visa liberalization.

5. Stabilization and Association Process for the Western Balkans

7. FORMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE EU COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY (CSDP)

1. Cooperation in the field of SSCP on the preparation and signing of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement.

2. Russia's military aggression against Ukraine in 2014. EU missions in Ukraine.

3. Implementation of the provisions of the Association Agreement in the area of the Common Foreign and Security Policy.

4. Political cooperation in the context of the russian-Ukrainian war in 2022. Prospects of Ukraine's accession to the EU

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CONTENT OF INDEPENDENT WORK:

1. THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF IDEAS AND CONCEPTS OF A UNITED EUROPE

1. Take notes on the work of R. Coudengové-Kalergi "Pan-Europe: The Project".
2. Describe the development of the Pan-European movement after World War II.
3. Write down the definition of European integration in terms of different European integration theories.
4. Compare the main provisions of the concepts of federalism, functionalism and neofunctionalism.

2. STAGES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND THEIR CHARACTERISTICS. FOUNDATION AND INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

1. Analyze the provisions of the Treaty of Paris of 1951 establishing the European Coal and Steel Community.

2. Analyze the provisions of the Treaty of Rome of 1957 establishing the European Economic Community.

3. Briefly describe the main bodies of the EU: European Council, European Commission, Council, European Parliament, European Court of Justice, Court of Auditors.

4. Draw a diagram of the decision-making process in the EU.

5. Describe the three pillars of the EU on the basis of the Maastricht Treaty of 1992.

6. Evaluate the Treaty of Lisbon of 2007.

3. Development of political cooperation of European communities. Establishment and development of the CFSP

1. Identify the reasons for the failure of military and political integration projects in Western Europe.

2. Analyze the reports of Davignon and Tindemans.

3. Summarize the main provisions of the Single European Act of 1987.

4. Draw a diagram of the three-pillar structure of the EU after the Maastricht Treaty of 1992.

4. Development of political cooperation of European communities. Establishment and development of the CFSP

1. Formation and development of the EU Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP)

2. Identify the strengthening of the CSDP after the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997.

3. Identify the changes in the EU institutional structure introduced by the Treaty of Nice in 2002.

4. Make a chronological table of the EU crisis management missions

5. Formation of the military dimension of the CDSP

(Individual task) Create a multimedia presentation on the topic: "Military operations and civilian missions of the EU"

6. The EU as a global actor in the security sphere

1. Make a comparative analysis of the EU's approaches to security challenges in accordance with the 2003 and 2016 strategies.

2. Identify the place of Ukraine in the EU security policy.

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3. Describe the EU Strategic Compass as an action plan for strengthening the EU's defense and security policy until 2030.

7. ENLARGEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: MECHANISMS, RESULTS AND PROSPECTS

1. Describe the features of the stages of EU enlargement and the principles developed in the course of the enlargement policy.

2. Analyze the document: Copenhagen European Council, June 21-22, 1993. 7. Relations with the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe. URL: http://www.infoeuropa.ro/docs/ copenhagen.pdf.

3. Define the goal of the Stabilization and Association Process for the Western Balkans (1999).

8. THE EUROPEAN UNION AND UKRAINE

1. Describe the main provisions of the 1994 EU-Ukraine Partnership and Cooperation Agreement.

2. Analyze the EU-Ukraine Action Plan 2005.

3. Prepare a report on the following topic: "The problem of visa-free regime for Ukraine within the Eastern Partnership"

4. Analyze the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement of 2014.

5. Analyze the stages of the application of EU sanctions against Russia in connection with the armed aggression of 2014 and the war of 2022.

6. Make a chronological table of Ukraine's political measures towards EU membership.

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